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Islamic vs. conventional banking: Business model, efficiency and stability

Journal of Banking & Finance 2013 37(2), 433-447
How different are Islamic banks from conventional banks? Does the recent crisis justify a closer look at the Sharia-compliant business model for banking? When comparing conventional and Islamic banks, controlling for time-variant country-fixed effects, we find few significant differences in business orientation. There is evidence however, that Islamic banks are less cost-effective, but have a higher intermediation ratio, higher asset quality and are better capitalized. We also find large cross-country variation in the differences between conventional and Islamic banks as well as across Islamic banks of different sizes. Furthermore, we find that Islamic banks are better capitalized, have higher asset quality and are less likely to disintermediate during crises. The better stock performance of listed Islamic banks during the recent crisis is also due to their higher capitalization and better asset quality.<br/><br/>Highlights<br/><br/>► We compare conventional and Islamic banks across 22 countries with both bank types. ► Islamic banks are less efficient, but intermediate more, especially during crises. ► During crises, Islamic banks are better capitalized, with lower loan losses. ► Recent stock performance of Islamic banks due to more capital and lower loan losses.

Banks’ intraday liquidity management during operational outages: Theory and evidence from the UK payment system

Journal of Banking & Finance 2010 34(2), 314-323
We investigate how settlement banks in the United Kingdom’s large-value payment system deal with intraday liquidity and operational risk. In particular, we are interested in payments behaviour towards a bank that is, for operational reasons, unable to make but able to receive payments. If other banks did not sufficiently monitor their outgoing payments, these operational shocks could impact the entire payment system because the affected bank could absorb liquidity from the system. Our game-theoretic model predicts that only early in the day, when they are uncertain about the payment instructions they might have to execute, banks stop sending payments to a counterparty which is unable to make payments. Using a non-parametric method, we find that this prediction is supported by the data, implying that banks effectively contain the disruption caused by the operational outage: payment flows between healthy banks remain unaffected.