One reason for the recent asset price bubbles in many developed countries could be regulatory capital arbitrage. Regulatory and legal changes can help traditional banks to move their assets off their balance sheets into the lightly regulated shadows and thus enable regulatory arbitrage through the securitized sector. This paper adopts a global vector autoregression (GVAR) methodology to assess the effects of regulatory capital arbitrage on equity prices, house prices and economic activity across 11 OECD countries/regions. A counterfactual experiment disentangles the effects of regulatory arbitrage following a change in the net capital rule for investment banks in April 2004 and the adoption of the Basel II Accord in June 2004. The results provide evidence for the existence of an international finance multiplier, with about half of the countries overshooting U.S. impulse responses. The counterfactual shows that regulatory arbitrage via the U.S. securitized sector may enhance the cross-country reallocation of capital from housing markets towards equity markets.

This paper investigates whether bank integration measured by cross-border bank flows can capture the co-movements across housing markets in developed countries by using a spatial dynamic panel model. The transmission can occur through a global banking channel in which global banks intermediate wholesale funding to local banks. Changes in financial conditions are passed across borders through the banks’ balance-sheet exposure to credit, currency, maturity, and funding risks resulting in house price spillovers. While controlling for country-level and global factors, we find significant co-movement across housing markets of countries with proportionally high bank integration. Bank integration can better capture house price co-movements than other measures of economic integration. Once we account for bank exposure, other spatial linkages traditionally used to account for return co-movements across region – such as trade, foreign direct investment, portfolio investment, geographic proximity, etc. – become insignificant. Moreover, we find that the co-movement across housing markets decreases for countries with less developed mortgage markets characterized by fixed mortgage rate contracts, low limits of loan-to-value ratios and no mortgage equity withdrawal.