Bank safety nets, originally proposed as a means of stabilizing financial systems, have become an important destabilizing influence. Government protection of bank debts encourages banks to undertake excessive risk, particularly in response to adverse shocks to asset values. Reforms that would remove the destabilizing moral hazard consequences of government protection are considered, both from the perspective of economic desirability and political feasibility. Requiring banks to maintain a minimal proportion of subordinated debt finance, and restricting the means by which government recapitalization of insolvent banks occurs are the central features of promising reforms to the safety net.

By many measures, bank consolidation waves, historically and currently, produce substantial efficiency gains associated with reduced operating costs, enhanced diversification, and the enrichment of bank-customer relationships. These gains may be hard to discover in panel or cross-sectional analyses of individual banks because merger waves pose special econometric pitfalls for event studies of stock returns and bank performance comparisons. We review these problems and summarize lessons from nine case studies of individual merger transactions which offer qualitative evidence that potential econometric pitfalls can be important. Those conclusions suggest placing greater weight on cross-regime comparisons for measuring gains during bank merger waves.