I examine the behavior of forex prices around the setting of the 4:00 pm WMR Fix. Numerous banks have been fined by regulators for their trading activities around the Fix, but the overall impact of their actions is not known. I first examine trading patterns around the Fix in a microstructure model of competitive trading. I then compare the model with the empirical behavior of forex prices across 21 currencies over a decade. Contrary to the predictions of the model, forex price changes display extraordinary volatility and negative serial correlation around the Fix.

I use account-level credit card and term loan data to analyze consumers’ responses to anticipated increases in cash on hand following term loan run-offs. Financial constraints are elicited using past credit card payment behavior and can explain the response of credit card but not term loan expenditure: unconstrained consumers are 23% more likely to finance new durable goods with term loans after the run-off. The results provide evidence of consumers engaging in sequential term loan borrowing.

Recently there have been a number of recommendations to increase the role of subordinated debt (SND) in satisfying bank capital requirements as a preferred means to discipline the risk-taking behavior of systemically important banks. One such proposal recommended using SND yield spreads as the triggers for mandatory supervisory action under prompt corrective action guidelines introduced in US banking legislation in the early 1990s. Currently such action is prompted by bank capital ratios. Evidence from previous research suggests that yield information may be a better predictor of bank problems. This paper empirically analyzes potential costs and benefits of using SND signals to trigger prompt corrective action.

Agency theory suggests that governance matters more among firms with greater potential agency costs. Rational investors are unlikely to value safeguards against unlikely events. Yet, few studies of the relation between governance and firm value control for investor perceptions of the likelihood of agency conflicts. Shleifer and Vishny [Shleifer, A., Vishny, R.W., 1997. A survey of corporate governance. Journal of Finance 52, 737–783] identify investment-related agency conflicts as the more severe type of agency conflicts in the US. We measure the perceived likelihood of this type of agency conflict using free cash flow (Jensen, M.C., 1986. Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers. American Economic Review 76, 323–329). We find that firm value is an increasing function of improved governance quality among firms with high free cash flow. In contrast, governance benefits are lower or insignificant among firms with low free cash flow. We show that not controlling for this conditional relation between governance and firm value could lead to erroneous conclusions that governance and firm value are unrelated.

Recent models of IPO underpricing suggest that high-quality firms underprice their IPOs to differentiate themselves from low-quality firms and, thus, receive a more favorable market response to subsequent equity offerings. We test this suggestion for 172 industrial firms that made an initial public offering during 1987–1991 and made a subsequent seasoned equity offering within three years of their IPO. We examine two measures of the impact of the hypothesized underpricing signal net of the cost of employing that signal. Inconsistent with the underpricing signal hypothesis, we find no evidence that firms recover the cost of an underpriced IPO in either higher issue proceeds or in greater wealth for the firm's initial owners.

We examine the relationship between U.S. thrift institution ownership structure and risk taking along with the impact of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA) on this relationship. Our results, based on various indicators of risk, suggest that insider controlled thrifts were more likely to engage in risk taking prior to 1989 than were diversely held institutions. FIRREA seems to have curtailed much of this risk taking. We find inverse relationships between risk-taking and levels of institutional shareholdings. This along with other evidence suggests that the motive for risk-taking was not maximization of the ‘option’ value of shares as has been reported elsewhere. We also find evidence that entrenched managers may have generated significant private benefits.

This paper examines the impact of the current financial crisis on long-term US Treasury yields by testing the impact of a series of events from December 2007 to March 2009 on the spread between 10-year USD LIBOR swap and 10-year US Treasury (constant maturity) rates to measure risk associated with Treasuries. Controlling for the liquidity of the two markets, the default risk of the swap, and the net foreign purchases of Treasury securities, we find that 13 of the tested 20 events have significantly negative coefficients. We conclude that the lower spread is consistent with greater default risk for US Treasury securities.

H. Wang and C. Wang [Visibility of the compass rose in financial asset returns: A quantitative study, J. Bank. Financ. 26 (2002), 1099–1111] derive a measure of the visibility of the radial patterns that appear in a plot of current and past returns, which are more commonly known as the compass rose. In theory, this measure should be positively related to the tick/volatility ratio. In practice however, we find that this relationship does not hold for higher tick/volatility ratios that are common to stock market data. Thus, the use of this measure is limited in real world applications. We propose a correction factor that improves the behaviour of the quality measure over higher tick/volatility ratios, however, further research is required to fully identify and correct the problem.

This paper aims to provide a comprehensive analysis of the potential conflicts between macroprudential and monetary policies within a DGSE model with financial frictions. The identification of conflicts is conditional on different types of shocks, policy instruments, and policy objectives. We first find that conflicts are not systematic but are fairly frequent, especially in the case of supply-side and widespread shocks such as investment efficiency and bank capital shocks. Second, monetary policy and countercyclical capital requirements generate conflicts in many circumstances. By affecting interest rates, they both “get in all the cracks”, albeit with their respective targets generally moving in opposite directions. Nonetheless, monetary policy could reduce its adverse financial side effects by responding strongly to the output gap. Third, countercyclical loan-to-value caps, as sector-specific instruments, cause fewer conflicts. Thus, they can be more easily implemented without concerns about generating spillovers, whereas smooth coordination is required between state-contingent capital requirements and monetary policy.