We employ a difference-in-differences estimation approach to examine the impact of stakeholder orientation on corporate payout policy. The empirical test exploits the enactment of US state-level constituency statutes, which allow directors to consider stakeholders and long-term interests in corporate decision making. We find that firms incorporated in states that have adopted constituency statutes significantly reduce share repurchases, whereas the effects of statute enactment on total payout and dividend payments are marginal and insignificant, respectively. We further show that the negative statute effect on share repurchases is more pronounced for firms that are in financial distress or are close to default, and firms in consumer-focused and high-polluting industries. Overall, our findings indicate that promoting stakeholder orientation can have a significant impact on corporate payout decisions.

This paper combines the static effect of ownership and the dynamic effect of privatization on bank performance in China over 1995–2010, reporting a significantly higher performance by private intermediaries – joint stock commercial banks and city commercial banks – relative to state-owned commercial banks. However, publicly traded banks, subject to multiple monitoring and vetting in capital markets, perform better regardless of ownership status. The privatization of banks has improved performance with respect to revenue inflow and efficiency gains in the short- or long-run (initial public offerings). The positive long-run effect is more relevant and significant for banking institutions with minority foreign ownership. Moreover, this paper innovatively estimates interest income efficiency and non-interest income efficiency at the same time. The results suggest that Chinese banks are much more efficient in generating interest income than raising non-interest revenue, although the latter aspect has improved significantly during the sample period.

China's financial deregulation has led to the rise of individual-controlled fund management companies, where the largest shareholder is a person rather than an institution. This study examines these mutual funds, known as “individual-controlled funds” (ICFs), particularly from the perspective of potential conflict of interest. ICFs are more likely to prioritize performance given there is limited interference in their activities by affiliated institutions. They consistently outperform peers by 0.7 % per month, after accounting for fund characteristics. This outperformance is more pronounced when the largest individual owner has greater influence in the fund company. We also document the lower propensity of ICFs to engage in misconduct. Our findings demonstrate that minimizing conflicts of interest benefits performance in the mutual fund industry.

In this paper, we investigate value creation by hedge funds using Berk and van Binsbergen's (2015) value-added. We find that, on average, a hedge fund manager extracts $0.76 million per month from the market. We provide strong evidence of persistence in value creation by hedge fund managers. Of three skill indicators—skill ratio, fee ratio, and total compensation—we find that total compensation best identifies the skilled manager out-of-sample. Investors in value-creating funds benefit from a better risk–return payoff. While hedge funds operate in a less competitive market than mutual funds, incentive fees do not indicate greater skill. The value that hedge funds can extract from the market depends on both the profitability and scalability of the investment strategy.

We document strong time-series momentum effects in individual stocks in the US markets from 1927 to 2017. Time-series momentum is not specific to sub-periods, firm sizes, formation- and holding-period lengths, or geographic markets. The effects persist after controlling for standard risk factors. Time-series momentum effects are conditional on the market state, the information discreteness of the constituent stocks and investor sentiment. We propose two alternative implementations, revised time-series momentum and dual momentum, which generate even higher profits than standard time-series momentum.

We use a simple two-stage dividend growth model to connect profitability growth and firm scale to stock returns. In this framework, both the magnitude and the length of the first-stage growth play a key role in determining returns. Using current profitability growth to estimate magnitude and firm scale as inverse proxy for length, we predict that future returns should increase with current profitability growth but, crucially, the effect should diminish with firm scale. Across a range of empirical tests, we find strong evidence in support of our model determinants and predictions. Our findings are not explained by an array of associated, potentially confounding variables.

We examine the information role of financial advisors by focusing on mergers and acquisitions in which acquiring firms hire target firms’ ex-advisors. We document that by employing targets’ ex-advisors, acquirers pay lower takeover premiums and secure a larger proportion of merger synergies. The corresponding targets exhibit lower announcement returns and are less likely to be propositioned by competing bidders. These results indicate that acquirers take advantage of value-relevant information about targets through targets’ ex-advisors, and achieve bargaining advantages in deal negotiations. In contrast, we document no discernible value effects when targets hire acquirers’ ex-advisors, suggesting that the information role of acquirers’ ex-advisors hired by targets is weaker than that of targets’ ex-advisors hired by acquirers.

We document a systematic seasonal component in the aggregate underperformance of active mutual funds. At the aggregate level, active funds underperform the market and other passive benchmarks only in the first month of a quarter. This intra-quarter performance seasonality holds across fund sizes and investment styles. The pattern is consistent with short-term stock return reversal effects along with aggregate window-dressing and, to a lesser extent, NAV-inflation practices around quarter-ends. We find marginal or no evidence of microstructure biases, fund investor flows, or cash distributions as sources of this seasonality. Our findings highlight new features of the active management underperformance puzzle.