Knowledge that Transforms

This paper proposes a new approach to estimate the idiosyncratic volatility premium. In contrast to the popular two-pass regression method, this approach relies on a novel GMM-type estimation procedure that uses only a single cross-section of return observations to obtain consistent estimates. Also, it enables a comparison of idiosyncratic volatility premia estimated using stock returns with different holding periods. The approach is empirically illustrated by applying it to daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, and annual US stock return data over the course of 2000–2011. The results suggest that the idiosyncratic volatility premium tends to be positive on daily return data, but negative on monthly, quarterly, and annual data. They also indicate the presence of a January effect.

We present the results of the first experimental study of financial markets contagion. We develop a model of financial contagion amenable to be tested in the laboratory. In the model, contagion happens because of cross-market rebalancing, a channel for transmission of shocks across markets first studied by Kodres and Pritsker (2002). Theory predicts that, because of portfolio rebalancing, a negative shock in one market transmits itself to the others, as investors adjust their portfolio allocations. The theory is supported by the experimental results. The price observed in the laboratory is close to that predicted by theory, and strong contagion effects are observed. The results are robust across different market structures. Moreover, as theory predicts, lower asymmetric information in a (“developed”) financial market increases the contagion effects in (“emerging”) markets.

This paper analyzes the productivity and efficiency of Turkish banks from 2002 to 2010. We obtained estimates of efficiency, productivity growth and efficiency growth using a Bayesian stochastic frontier approach and focused on accounting for Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) for use in our model. Specifically, we introduce NPLs as a bad output in an input distance function, and estimate a system of non-linear equations subject to endogeneity. We confirm that the productivity growth of Turkish banks was positive over the period of this study, which was mainly due to the improvement in technology, while efficiency growth continued to be negative over the same period. Methodologically, we also prove that not accounting for NPLs in estimating the frontier model might seriously distort the efficiency and productivity results. The study also provides measures of shadow prices for NPL and discusses the results in terms of several interesting trends in Turkish banking. Finally, the paper provides efficiency and productivity comparisons between domestic and foreign banks.

This paper investigates contagion between bank and sovereign default risk in Europe over the period 2007–2012. We define contagion as excess correlation, i.e. correlation between banks and sovereigns over and above what is explained by common factors, using CDS spreads at the bank and at the sovereign level. Moreover, we investigate the determinants of contagion by analyzing bank-specific as well as country-specific variables and their interaction. Using the EBA’s disclosure of sovereign exposures of banks, we provide empirical evidence that three contagion channels are at work: a guarantee channel, an asset holdings channel and a collateral channel. We find that banks with a weak capital buffer, a weak funding structure and less traditional banking activities are particularly vulnerable to risk spillovers. At the country level, the debt ratio is the most important driver of contagion. Furthermore, the impact of government interventions on contagion depends on the type of intervention, with outright capital injections being the most effective measure in reducing spillover intensity.

This paper investigates the impact of newspaper articles about skimming fraud on debit card usage in the Netherlands using daily transaction data and daily newspaper announcements from January 1st 2005 to December 31st 2008. Key finding is that articles about skimming fraud significantly affect same day debit card usage. The direction and strength of the media effects strongly depend on the specific characteristics of the publications, such as type of fraud addressed and their position in the newspaper, but above all on the frequency with which they come out. The effects, however, are economically small compared to other factors, such as calendar and holiday effects, and do not sustain or accumulate in the long run. Yet, some first cost calculations demonstrate that the impact of media attention on total retail payments efficiency is not to be underestimated.

Prior to the 2007–2008 financial crisis, banking sector profits were very high but the profitability of financial intermediation was poor. Using a novel model of banking, this article argues that the high profits were achieved through balance sheet expansion and growing default, liquidity, and term risk mismatches between assets and liabilities. As a result, large banks’ financial leverage rose as they became less liquid, setting the conditions for a systemic banking crisis. This article argues that the increase in financial leverage was possible due to misguided changes in the regulatory framework, specifically, the Basel I capital accord and reductions in reserve requirements. Finally, this article overviews and assesses the policy response in the aftermath of the crisis.

This paper describes financial systemic risk as a pollution issue. Free riding leads to excess risk production. This problem may be solved, at least partially, either by financial regulation or by taxation. From a normative viewpoint, taxation is superior in many respects. However, reality shows that financial regulation is adopted more frequently. This paper makes a positive, politico-economic argument. If the majority chooses regulation, the level is likely to be too harsh. If it chooses taxation, then the level is likely to be too low. Due to regressive effects, a tax on financial transactions receives low support from a majority of low polluting portfolio owners. The same kind of majority may strategically choose regulation in order to burden the minority with a larger share of the cost of reducing systemic risk.

This paper analyzes market discipline in a many-bank economy where contagion and bank runs interact. We present a model with differently-informed depositors, where those depositors that are more informed have incentives to monitor banks’ investments. It is shown that when banks are undercapitalized, and the probability of success of the risky asset is low, depositors might prefer a contract that is subject to bank runs in the interim period to a contract that allows banks to gamble with their funds and maintain their investment.The results of the paper emphasize the benefits of private monitoring of banks in order to promote market discipline.

Despite the voluminous empirical research on the potential predictability of stock returns, much less attention has been paid to the predictability of bear and bull stock markets. In this study, the aim is to predict U.S. bear and bull stock markets with dynamic binary time series models. Based on the analysis of the monthly U.S. data set, bear and bull markets are predictable in and out of sample. In particular, substantial additional predictive power can be obtained by allowing for a dynamic structure in the binary response model. Probability forecasts of the state of the stock market can also be utilized to obtain optimal asset allocation decisions between stocks and bonds. It turns out that the dynamic probit models yield much higher portfolio returns than the buy-and-hold trading strategy in a small-scale market timing experiment.

We find evidence suggesting that corporate lobbying for tax purposes over the period 1999–2009 is one method by which firms managed corporate taxes. Furthermore, tax management strategies employed by these politically active firms were valued by shareholders. Firms lobbying on tax issues have lower book effective taxes and greater discretionary permanent differences in GAAP and IRS taxable income. Investors place a premium on lobbying activities for tax purposes unless the firm already has a low effective tax rate or very high book-tax differences. We conclude that lobbying political officials is one method by which firms manage risks attendant an aggressive tax strategy.