Knowledge that Transforms

This paper develops a model to answer the question whether a bank should hold a share of the equity of a borrowing firm. The model shows that a small equity stake held by the bank can have a significant and positive impact on the lending relationship. The benefit of bank equity participation arises from the reduced ability of the bank to extract rents from the firm in multiple rounds of financing. This, in turn, improves the firm’s incentive to make investments in profitable projects that require future outside finance. The benefit is likely to be significant for small to medium size firms, growth firms, and firms with ongoing capital needs. The paper addresses, from a corporate finance perspective, the current debate about whether banks should be allowed to own equity stakes in corporations – and how large these equity stakes should be.

I worked as a consultant in the Financial Stability Department (FSD) of the Bank of England for several years (2002–2004). In this paper I reflect on issues relating to the work of such an FSD, starting with the difficulty of defining or measuring ‘financial stability’. Stress tests are commonly used, but, for an FSD, should relate to the system as a whole, not just to individual institutions. FSDs need to assess the probability, virulence and speed of occurrence of potential shocks. There is a need to develop appropriate analytical models. The focus on capital adequacy has diverted attention from concern about having sufficient liquidity.

Price–concentration studies in banking typically find a significant and negative relationship between consumer deposit rates (i.e., prices) and market concentration. This implies highly concentrated banking markets are “bad” for depositors. It also provides support for the Structure-Conduct-Performance hypothesis and rejects the Efficient-Structure hypothesis. However, these studies have focused almost exclusively on supply-side control variables and neglected demand-side variables when estimating the reduced form price–concentration relationship. For example, previous studies have not included in their analysis bank-specific risk variables as measures of cross-sectional derived deposit demand. We find that when bank-specific risk variables are included in the analysis the magnitude of the relationship between deposit rates and market concentration decreases by over 50%. We offer an explanation for these results based on the correlation between a bank’s risk profile and the structure of the market in which it operates. These results suggest that it may be necessary to reconsider the well-established assumption that higher market concentration necessarily leads to anticompetitive deposit pricing behavior by commercial banks. This has direct implications for the antitrust evaluations of bank merger and acquisition proposals by regulatory agencies. And, in a more general sense, these results suggest that any Structure-Conduct-Performance based study that does not explicitly consider the possibility of very different risk profiles of the firms analyzed may indeed miss a very important set of explanatory variables. And, thus, the results from those studies may be spurious.

Using firm-level data from 52 countries we investigate how a country’s institutions and business environment affect firm’s organizational choices and what impact the organizational form has on access to finance and growth. We find that businesses are more likely to choose the corporate form in countries with developed financial sectors and efficient legal systems, strong shareholder and creditor rights, low regulatory burdens and corporate taxes and efficient bankruptcy processes. Corporations report fewer financing, legal and regulatory obstacles than unincorporated firms and this advantage is greater in countries with more developed institutions and favourable business environments. We do find some evidence of higher growth of incorporated businesses in countries with good financial and legal institutions.

This paper extends prior work on the links between political patronage and capital structure in developing economies. Three proxies of political patronage are developed and applied to a group of Malaysian firms over a 10-year period. We find a positive and significant link between leverage and each of the three measures of political patronage. We also find evidence of an indirect link between political patronage and capital structure through firm size and profitability.

This is an empirical study of the determinants of stock holdings using data from the US Survey of Consumer Finances from 1992 to 2001. There is a great heterogeneity in the way households form their portfolios. Stock ownership is positively correlated with various measures of wealth, age, retirement savings, and having sought financial advice. It is negatively correlated with holdings of alternative risky investments, such as investments in private businesses, and with the willingness to undertake non-financial investments in the future. While we can predict reasonably well who holds stocks, we have less predictive power about the share of stocks owned by those who hold positive amounts.

Financial stability has proved elusive. Despite the success of central banks in controlling inflation, economies continue to experience periods of exchange rate overvaluation, stock market volatility and housing price bubbles that affect individuals very deeply. This note speculates that such financial volatility may be the product of three factors, (a) successful inflation targeting, (b) the existence of nonlinearities and differential economic dynamics, and (c) the recent evolution of key structural parameters in the economy. If so, then central banks might better focus on making financial systems more resilient than on trying to develop more sophisticated policies aimed at reducing financial volatility.