Knowledge that Transforms

This paper examines the effects of an educational program on Sustainable Finance Literacy (SFL) and its influence on sustainable investment decisions. Through a randomized controlled trial and an incentivized choice experiment, we found that our SFL program significantly improves literacy. The program also increased the probability of investing in a highly sustainable fund by 6 percentage points on the extensive margin and decreased allocations between 3.2% and 2.7% for the less sustainable funds on the intensive margin. Among participants who already held pro-sustainability attitudes, the treatment additionally led to more investments in the highly sustainable fund on the intensive margin. Higher SFL further led to more critical sustainability assessments of mid-tier funds and reduced tendencies to chase past high returns.

Does the recent proliferation of technology in lending process have an impact on business loan market competition? Using a theoretical model that assumes heterogeneity in lenders’ screening abilities and borrowers’ investment horizons, we show that FinTech (Traditional) lenders primarily supply unsecured (asset-backed) loans to borrowers with short-term (long-term) projects. The model builds on the interplay between screening ability and collateral requirements to characterize the competition between two ex-ante symmetric lenders. Lenders use screening technology and collateral requirements to mitigate competition and restrict the supply of credit through an endogenous segmentation of the loan market. As information technology improves, the effect on credit supply and equilibrium interest rates becomes more nuanced and depends on the market segment. The results offer a supply-side explanation for the growth of unsecured lending.

Conventional linear benchmarked contracts tend to cause excessive pegging to the benchmark and thus price distortion of stocks in the benchmark. This paper studies the optimal delegation contract when there is principal-agent friction. Specifically, it explores the impacts of incorporating the risk of invested portfolio in the contract on optimal strategies of the principal and the agent as well as on equilibrium asset prices. When agency friction is severe, the optimal contract provides rewards for portfolio risk to improve risk sharing and grants compensation for index return to propel the agent to deviate from pegging to index. In equilibrium, the principal conducts index investment while the agent invests only in individual risky assets, and price distortion caused by agency friction is mitigated.

We analyze the impact of easing borrower-based measures on residential mortgage credit and borrower characteristics in the Czech Republic in early 2020. This easing included a relaxation of the LTV limit and the abolition of the DTI and DSTI limits. Our findings indicate that affected households increased borrowing, purchased more expensive houses, and accepted lower collateral values. Borrowers' debt service burdens rose but were offset by income growth. We find that: (i) LTV-constrained borrowers exhibited cash-retention behavior, while DTI- and DSTI-constrained borrowers aligned with the financial accelerator motive; (ii) LTV relaxation had a greater effect in poorer counties, while the abolition of DTI and DSTI limits affected richer regions; (iii) younger borrowers were more impacted by LTV and DTI easing, whereas DSTI easing influenced older borrowers; and (iv) LTV relaxation primarily affected first-time borrowers, while the abolition of DTI and DSTI limits impacted repeat borrowers, who obtained larger mortgages and purchased more expensive properties.

Using a unique proprietary dataset of daily mutual fund trading records and the COVID-19 pandemic-triggered lockdown in Wuhan (China) as a natural experiment, we find that individual mutual fund investors in Wuhan significantly reduced their daily trading frequency, total investment of their portfolios, and risk level of their invested funds during the lockdown period as compared to investors in other cities. The results suggest that the elimination of face-to-face interaction among individual investors during the lockdown reduced their information sharing, which led to more conservatism in their financial trading. We rule out alternative explanations of salience bias due to limited investor attention and temporary changes in personal circumstances such as depression and/or income reduction, during the lockdown period. Finally, consistent with the theory of naïve investor trading, we also find that investors received higher trading returns during the lockdown as they reduced trading aggressively in the absence of face-to-face interactions.

In a theoretical context where innovators borrow loans or settle for state-owned enterprise (SOE) sponsorship for their projects, we examine the effects of banking prudential regulations and their interaction with corporate leverage on the patenting partnership choice in China using a unique matched patent-firm-bank loan dataset for 15,623 observations in the 2013–17 period. We use a unique instrumental variable (IV) strategy to identify idiosyncratic bank prudential reform shocks associated with the post-2012 Basel III regulation and find prudential metrics (corporate leverage) of the financiers (firms) to positively (negatively) influence SOE patenting partnership choice, though prudential regulation mitigates the latter. Prudential reforms therefore come at a cost of further SOE dominance. However, conditional on an innovation project being SOE sponsored, we find positive spillover effect from the SOE’s employment mandate to loan productivity. Our results are robust across different IV strategies, alternative measures, sub-sample and mechanism analyses.

Does pledging movables as collateral alter corporate borrowing? To answer this question, we study the effect of collateral law reforms on syndicated bank loans granted across nine European countries that facilitated pledging movables between 1995 and 2019, comparing them to 19 countries that did not. We differentiate firms in sectors of higher versus lower asset movability to strengthen the identification. We find that although the reforms have enabled firms in movable-intensive sectors to issue more secured loans, the average cost of the loans and the number of covenants have also increased. Channel tests suggest that banks may demand more to compensate for the potential wealth redistribution induced by newly issued secured credit, or the unique risk involved with using movables as collateral.