We investigate the nascent but fast-growing Chinese bond market and credit rating industry. We find Chinese bond ratings are informative and significantly correlated with bond offering yields. In addition, the Chinese bond investors distinguish ratings from different credit rating agencies (CRAs), demanding lower yields on bonds rated by global-partnered CRAs. However, the empirical results suggest that the rating scales used by Chinese CRAs are not comparable to those of international CRAs. Furthermore, Chinese CRAs have very broad rating scales and pool bonds with significantly different default risks into a single rating category, resulting in over 90% of bonds in only three rating categories.

Unique features and market frictions can lead to idiosyncratic pricing for some US Treasury securities. This study uses a linear programming (LP) model to measure aggregate idiosyncratic pricing of T-notes and T-bonds from 1980 to 2016. We document an average idiosyncratic pricing of $0.11 per $100 par, as compared to an average bid-ask spread of $0.08. Further, idiosyncratic pricing declined dramatically from the early 1980s to the 2010s. Empirical evidence suggests that the 1986 Tax Reform Act, increasing issue sizes and improving market liquidity contribute to the decline. At the individual security level, we identify factors contributing to and mitigating idiosyncratic pricing.

We investigate the relationship between internal governance and firms' innovation. We hypothesize that internal governance stemming from the difference in expected employment horizons between a CEO and her subordinate executives improves a firm's innovation. Using the age difference between a CEO and her subordinate executives as the primary measure of internal governance, we find a strong positive relationship between internal governance and firms' innovation output, and scientific and economic values. We show that the positive relation is causal and robust based on empirical tests including exogenous variation in internal governance resulting from non-forced CEO turnovers. We further show that the relationship between internal governance and innovation is more pronounced when external governance is weaker and when subordinate executives are expected to have more influence on the board. Cross-sectional analysis shows that internal governance spurs innovation in younger firms, firms led by generalist CEOs, and when the likelihood of insider successions is higher.

Using a broad sample of earnings announcements, we find a monotonic increase in the spread between call and put implied volatilities as it gets closer to the earnings announcement date. The steady build-up of volatility spread in the days leading up to the announcement date, coupled with the predictive power of cumulative abnormal implied volatility spread on subsequent announcement returns, suggests that informed traders are the driving force behind the option market activities prior to earnings announcements. Such informed trading, as proxied by the abnormal implied volatility spread, increases rather than decreases the stock market response to earnings announcements after controlling for an array of firm and announcement characteristics. This effect is most pronounced when the pre-earnings option trading volume is heightened. Overall, our findings lend strong support to the notion that informed options trading immediately before earnings announcements helps alleviate the stock market under-reaction to earnings announcements and make it closer to a complete response.

Recent research suggests that insiders’ incentives for capturing cash flows affect price formation process in which insiders are inclined to withhold good news and to accelerate the release of bad news (Jin and Myers, 2006). We investigate whether insiders’ incentives for private control benefit, proxied by control-ownership wedge, affect firm-specific return characteristics. We find that control-ownership wedge is negatively related to the likelihood of positive return jumps and positively related to the extent of asymmetric market reaction to good news rather than to bad news. Overall, our results support the notion that corporate insiders increase opaqueness and withhold good news in order to capture unexpected cash flow.

This study examines whether insiders’ incentives for private control benefits affect investment sensitivity to stock price. While Chen et al. (2007) link stock price informativeness to firms’ learning from the stock market, we offer an alternative agency-cost based explanation. Using a total of 2822 firms from 22 countries in East Asia and Western Europe, we document a strong negative association between control-ownership wedge and investment-q sensitivity, suggesting that insiders’ incentives for private control benefit reduce their propensity to listen to the market. Furthermore, the negative impact of wedge on investment-q sensitivity is primarily driven by sub-optimal investments. Overall, we provide evidence that agency problem is an important factor that determines the learning from the stock market in capital allocation.

Using a corporate culture measure based on the textual analysis of the Q&A section of earnings conference calls, we document robust evidence that similar corporate cultural values between supply chain partners improve the financial performance of suppliers. Consistent with the view that supplier–customer cultural similarity facilitates communication, promotes altruistic attitudes, and builds trust between trading partners, we find that culturally similar suppliers experience higher cost efficiency, fewer problems with underinvestment, and better innovation performance. Our results also indicate that cultural similarity benefits customers, although to a lesser extent. Overall, our study sheds new light on how inter-firm cultural similarity influences firm performance along the supply chain.

We use common factor analysis on seven individual management quality measures to extract a management quality factor and examine its relationship with corporate social performance. Using managers’ draft risk during the Vietnam War as an instrumental variable for management quality, we find that firms with higher-quality managers score better in Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR). The cross-sectional results suggest that high-quality managers strategically invest in CSR when potential benefits outweigh the costs. Specifically, the positive relationship between management quality and CSR is more pronounced for firms under fierce product market competition when CSR is crucial for differentiating the firm from its competitors. Moreover, CSR becomes more sensitive to management quality when customer awareness and investor attention are high, increasing the likelihood that CSR enhances customer perception and investor trust. Finally, we find that CSR investment by high-quality managers creates more shareholder value, suggesting that higher-quality managers are more capable of “doing well by doing good.”

Hong and Kacperczyk (2010) document that decreases in analyst competition due to broker mergers encourage analysts to please managers, leading to greater consensus optimism bias. We propose three additional effects of analyst competition. The analyst effort hypothesis suggests that weaker competition reduces analysts’ incentives to collect and analyze information. The herding hypothesis argues that weaker competition reduces analysts’ career concerns, which in turn reduces herding incentives. The strategic deviation hypothesis implies that weaker competition alleviates analysts’ incentives to strategically deviate from others. We find that after broker mergers, analysts follow fewer firms and switch their coverage from firms with more to those with less R&D expenses. They weigh their private information less when it is unfavorable. At the same time, their forecasts become more dispersed. All these findings appear to be more consistent with the analyst effort hypothesis than the herding or strategic deviation hypothesis.