Knowledge that Transforms

A number of authors have found that firm size and book-to-market-value capture the cross-sectional variation in average stock returns. More importantly, these variables have been shown to out-perform the CAPM's β coefficient in explaining the cross-section of US stock returns. However, these studies all employ variants of the two-step estimator due to Fama and MacBeth (Fama, E.F., MacBeth, J.D., 1973. Risk, return and equilibrium: Empirical tests. Journal of Political Economy 71, 607–636), which impose implicitly the restriction that idiosyncratic returns are uncorrelated. In this paper we use a one-step estimator due to McElroy et al. (McElroy, M.B., Burmeister, E., Wall, K.D., 1985. Two estimators for the APT model when factors are measured. Economics Letters 19, 271–275) and find a highly significant role for β risk in the UK stock market when we allow for correlation amongst idiosyncratic returns.

This paper surveys the empirical and theoretical literature on the mechanisms of corporate governance. We focus on the internal mechanisms of corporate governance (e.g., corporate board of directors) and their role in ameliorating various classes of agency problems arising from conflicts of interests between managers and equityholders, equityholders and creditors, and capital contributors and other stakeholders to the corporate firm. We also examine the substitution effect between internal mechanisms of corporate governance and external mechanisms, particularly markets for corporate control. Directions for future research are provided.

We provide evidence on the costs and profitability of relationship lending by banks. We derive bank-specific measures of loan rate smoothing for small business borrowers in response to exogenous shocks to their credit risk and to interest rates, and then estimate cost and profit functions to examine how smoothing affects bank costs and profits. Our results suggests that, in general, loan rate smoothing in response to a credit risk shock is not part of an optimal long-term contract between a bank and its borrower, while loan rate smoothing in response to an interest-rate shock is.

This paper presents a condition equivalent to the existence of a Riskless Shadow Asset that guarantees a minimum return when the asset prices are convex functions of interest rates or other state variables. We apply this lemma to immunize default-free and option-free coupon bonds and reach three main conclusions. First, we give a solution to an old puzzle: why do simple duration matching portfolios work well in empirical studies of immunization even though they are derived in a model inconsistent with equilibrium and shifts on the term structure of interest rates are not parallel, as assumed? Second, we establish a clear distinction between the concepts of immunized and maxmin portfolios. Third, we develop a framework that includes the main results of this literature as special cases. Next, we present a new strategy of immunization that consists in matching duration and minimizing a new linear dispersion measure of immunization risk.

This paper measures the impact of option introductions on the return variance of underlying stocks. Past research generally finds a significant reduction in stock return variance following the listing of options through 1986. Using a more extensive sample, I compare changes in the return variance of optioned stocks to changes in the return variance of a control group. Since the average change in the control group is statistically indistinguishable from the average change in the optioned stocks, I conclude that option introductions do not significantly affect stock return variance.

We investigate the abnormal returns and market-based risk effects of four Federal Reserve Board decisions to allow bank holding companies to engage in investment banking through Section 20 subsidiaries. Positive abnormal returns for commercial banks were observed for initial, limited powers granted by the Federal Reserve. However, authorization to engage in underwriting corporate debt and equity and subsequent expansion of potential revenues from underwritings produced negative abnormal returns and increases in risk.

Within the past few years, public efforts have sought to encourage individual, or “angel”, investors. This article provides an overview of the motivations for these efforts. It assesses the underlying challenges that the financing of young growth firms pose, the ways that specialized financial intermediaries address them, and the rationales for public efforts to encourage angel investors. The final section raises a set of questions about the practical implementation of these efforts.

The widespread Italian practice of multiple borrowing has been studied with respect to the continuity of bank lending and to the interest rates charged to individual borrowers. However, there is a lack of empirical evidence on the effects of multiple credit relationships over the fragility of the corporate borrowers. Two theses are competing: one asserts that multiple borrowing results in a desirable sharing of risks; the other, that the parcellization of loans substantially weakens the discipline exercised by the banks and makes corporate borrowers more fragile. Through multivariate techniques, we check whether the indicators describing the structure of lending relationships can help, along with balance-sheet variables, to separate healthy from failed firms. This exercise shows that multiple banking relationships are associated with a higher riskiness of the borrowers, even though the impact is moderate in comparison with the importance of real and financial variables derived from balance sheets.