Knowledge that Transforms

We examine whether foreign and domestic banks in Central and Eastern Europe react differently to business cycles and banking crises. Our panel dataset comprises data of more than 250 banks for the period 1993–2000, with information on bank ownership and mode of entry. During crisis periods domestic banks contracted their credit base, whereas greenfield foreign banks did not. Also, home country conditions matter for foreign bank growth, as there is a significant negative relationship between home country economic growth and host country credit by greenfields. Finally, greenfield foreign banks’ credit growth is influenced by the health of the parent bank.

Are the less productive banks catching up to the more productive ones and, if so, how quickly and by what means? The objective of this study is to answer these questions by looking for convergence in productivity among bank holding companies (BHCs) in the US Past research has identified two major factors governing productivity in the banking sector – scale economies and X-efficiency. If the gains from scale economies decline with firm size and if the only difference between BHCs lies in their initial size, then the initially smaller BHCs should eventually catch up to the initially larger ones because the former tend to grow more quickly. However, the findings from this study do not support this hypothesis of “absolute convergence”. Indeed, the findings show strong evidence for “conditional convergence”, which means that the steady-state productivity to which a BHC is converging is conditional on the BHCs own level of X-efficiency. Conditional convergence implies that initial differences in X-efficiency among BHCs can, between them, create permanent differences in steady-state productivity.

Corporate governance theory predicts that leverage affects agency costs and thereby influences firm performance. We propose a new approach to test this theory using profit efficiency, or how close a firm’s profits are to the benchmark of a best-practice firm facing the same exogenous conditions. We are also the first to employ a simultaneous-equations model that accounts for reverse causality from performance to capital structure. We find that data on the US banking industry are consistent with the theory, and the results are statistically significant, economically significant, and robust.

It is often the case in default modeling that the need arises to calibrate a model to some prior probability of default. In many situations, a researcher may not know the true prior default rate for the population because the data set at hand is itself incomplete, either with respect to default identification (hidden defaults) or default under reporting. In situations where a researcher has access to two incomplete default data sets, for example in the case of two banks that have merged, it is possible to infer the number of “missing” defaults, which we demonstrate in this short note. We discuss an approach to estimating this quantity and show an example in which we infer the number of missing defaults in the combined legacy databases of the former Moody’s Risk Management Services and the former KMV Corporation. While calibration is one application of this approach, the method is a general one that can be applied in other settings as well.

The Sarbanes–Oxley (Sarbox) legislation aimed to reduce the opacity of financial statements and improve the integrity of financial reporting by enhancing corporate disclosure and governance practices. We estimate the valuation effects of Sarbox for firms in the financial services industry and find that, except for securities firms, these firms significantly benefited from its adoption. As hypothesized, these positive effects may be attributed to expected improvement in the transparency of the relatively opaque financial services firms. We find that the cross-sectional variation in the valuation effects can be explained by disclosure and governance characteristics. Several of the significant factors are supportive of a compliance cost hypothesis. In particular, we find that the effects were less favorable for firms with less independent audit committees, without a financial expert on the audit committee, with less financial statement footnote disclosures, with less involved CEOs, and if they were smaller. In addition, reflecting the value of stronger governance, more favorable effects occurred for firms with a greater degree of independence of the board and the board committees, when there is greater motivation and ability of board members to monitor the firm, and with a greater degree of institutional ownership. Lastly, we find the wealth effects of firms viewed as non-compliant are significantly lower than firms viewed as compliant, and the variation across the group of non-compliant firms is explained by disclosure and governance measures.

Several European Union countries have recently implemented or are envisaging fiscal operations which improve budgetary figures but have no structural impact on government finances. We evaluate some of these measures using a balance sheet approach. In particular, we examine the degree to which reductions in government debt in EU countries has been accompanied by a decumulation of government assets. In the runup to Maastricht we find a strong correlation between changes in government liabilities and government assets, and larger declines in government assets in countries starting from higher public debt levels.

This paper investigates the short-term price behaviour of closed-end funds following eight large market-wide shocks. The findings, from a sample of 63 funds continuously traded on the London Stock Exchange, indicate that prices overreact relative to equilibrium given by net asset values. The speed of reversion in discounts following market-wide shocks is slower than that following fund-specific shocks of a similar magnitude. The post-shock persistence in discounts is related more to the ease of arbitrage rather than to liquidity, as proxied by fund size, or to the speed of recovery in the broader market. The discount decays more slowly for those funds that are difficult to arbitrage.

In this paper we focus on the assumption of a common efficient frontier when performing an efficiency study for the banking sector. The fact that environmental factors that are not appropriately controlled may easily bias efficiency estimates. First, we estimate a common cost and profit frontier. In this first stage, as an innovation to the literature, we use exogenously computed input prices rather than the normally used endogenous input prices. Second, we regress the estimated inefficiencies on a set of a bank’s strategic choices, local banking market variables, and local (regional) macro variables. For the analysis, we use a unique dataset of 401 largely independent cooperative local banks in the Netherlands for the years 1998 and 1999. Our results show that the use of exogenous input prices rather than endogenous input prices is particularly important for the cost frontier as the spread in cost inefficiencies becomes larger and more plausible. Our second stage results suggest that most of the estimated inefficiency indeed is managerial (X-) inefficiency. Environmental factors do play a role, but only to a limited extent.

In this paper we present the results of an international survey among 313 cfos on capital structure choice. We document several interesting insights on how theoretical concepts are being applied by professionals in the uk, the netherlands, germany, and france and we directly compare our results with previous findings from the us our results emphasize the presence of pecking-order behavior. At the same time this behavior is not driven by asymmetric information considerations. The static trade-off theory is confirmed by the importance of a target debt ratio in general, but also specifically by tax effects and bankruptcy costs. Overall, we find remarkably low disparities across countries, despite the presence of significant institutional differences. We find that private firms differ in many respects from publicly listed firms, e.g. Listed firms use their stock price for the timing of new issues. Finally, we do not find substantial evidence that agency problems are important in capital structure choice.

H. Wang and C. Wang [Visibility of the compass rose in financial asset returns: A quantitative study, J. Bank. Financ. 26 (2002), 1099–1111] derive a measure of the visibility of the radial patterns that appear in a plot of current and past returns, which are more commonly known as the compass rose. In theory, this measure should be positively related to the tick/volatility ratio. In practice however, we find that this relationship does not hold for higher tick/volatility ratios that are common to stock market data. Thus, the use of this measure is limited in real world applications. We propose a correction factor that improves the behaviour of the quality measure over higher tick/volatility ratios, however, further research is required to fully identify and correct the problem.