Credit default risk for an obligor can be hedged with either a credit default swap (CDS) or a constant maturity credit default swap (CMCDS). We find strong evidence of persistent differences in the hedging cost associated with the two comparable contracts. Between 2001 and 2006, it would have been more profitable to sell CDS and buy CMCDS while after the crisis between 2008 and 2013 the opposite strategy was profitable. Panel data tests indicate that for our sample period the implied forward CDS rates are unbiased estimates of future spot CDS rates. The changes in the company implied volatility is the main determinant of trading inefficiencies, followed by the changes in GDP and in the interest rates before the crisis, and the changes in sentiment index and in the VIX after the crisis

In this paper, we analyze the determinants and effects of credit default swap (CDS) trading initiation in the sovereign bond market. CDS trading initiation is associated with a 30–150 basis point reduction in sovereign bond yields, with greater yield reductions accruing to higher default risk economies. For countries with high default risk, rated B or lower by Standard and Poor’s, CDS initiation is also associated with significant price efficiency benefits in the underlying market. CDS trading initiation is more likely following increases in local equity index volatility, index spreads for regional and global CDS markets, or depreciation of the local currency relative to the US dollar, and decreases in a country’s ability to service foreign debt. Our results are robust to selection bias controls based on these factors

We investigate the information contained in the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and the U.S. Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) term structure of interest rates and report three novel findings. First, we document that the information contained in term structures are significantly different from one another. Second, we provide evidence of a significant change in the nature of this difference as the financial crisis began. Third, we find that the significant changes in the information content of CMT and LIBOR are consistent with significant shocks to credit default swap rates and tenor swap rates

Based on individual CDS transactions cleared by the Depository Trust & Clearing Corporation, we show that illiquidity strongly affects credit default swap premiums. We identify the following effects: first, transaction direction affects prices, as buy (sell) orders lead to premium increases (decreases). Second, larger transactions have a higher price impact. This finding stands in stark contrast to corporate bond markets. Third, traders charge higher premiums as a price for liquidity provision, not as compensation for asymmetric information. Fourth, buy-side investors pay significantly higher prices than dealers for demanding liquidity. Finally, inventory risk seems to matter little in explaining liquidity premiums

We generalize the asset dynamics assumptions of Leland (1994b) and Leland and Toft (1996) to a state dependent variance with constant elasticity process (CEV) and obtain analytical solutions for corporate debt and equity value. We use the GMM technique to extract the parameters by fitting the empirical data in the equity and credit default swap markets simultaneously. We find that the elasticity parameter is significantly different from zero for most of the firms and that the CEV model performs much better than the model with constant volatility in both in-sample fittings and out-of-sample predictions of CDS spreads

We derive a closed-form expression for the bilateral credit valuation adjustment of a credit default swap in presence of simultaneous defaults. We develop our analysis under a default intensity model specified by a class of three-dimensional subordinators, allowing for default dependence through common risk factors. We performance a suitable decomposition of the bilateral price into debit and credit valuation adjustment components. Those components do not have a symmetric impact on the price because of the joint event occurrences. Our analysis indicates that simultaneous defaults have material impact on the size and directionality of the adjustments. Our findings suggest policymakers to consider default clustering when designing counterparty valuation procedures, especially during periods of financial distress

This paper reveals the underlying market preferences for sovereign debt of distressed euro area countries. We employ a generalised flexible market loss, as it nests both the linear and the non-linear form, as a function of the ‘basis’, the difference between sovereign bond spread and the Credit Default Swap. Our evidence shows that market preferences lean towards pessimism for some countries, in particular Greece. Those preferences do not remain stable over time as they shift further towards pessimism post the Greek bail out in spring 2010. As part of sensitivity analysis we apply a multivariate loss function to account for contagion effects in forming market preferences among different sovereign bonds. We also examine the impact of specific financial and fiscal governance factors on market preferences. Our results suggest that the market closely monitor fiscal fundamentals so as to shape preferences