Science progresses by improving its measurement apparatus. This holds true in finance too. The new methodology of “complete identification”, using simple algebraic geometry, throws new light on Galton's Error in finance and economics and the resulting misinformation of investors. Mutual funds conventionally advertise their relative systematic market risk, or “betas”, to potential investors based on incomplete measurement by unidirectional bivariate projections: they commit Galton's Error by under-representing their systematic risk. Consequently, far too many mutual funds are marketed as “defensive” and too few as “aggressive”. Using the new methodology it is found that, out of a total of 3217 mutual funds, 2047 funds (63.7%) claimed to be defensive based on the current industry standard methodology, but only 608 (18.9%) actually are. This under-representation of systematic risk leads to inefficiencies in the capital allocation process, since biased betas lead to mispricing of mutual funds. Complete bivariate projections produce a correct representation of the epistemic uncertainty inherent in the bivariate measurement of relative market risk and provide a new CAPM taxonomy. Our conclusions have also serious consequences for the proper “bench-marking” and recent regulatory proposals for the mutual funds industry. Extension of the new methodology to multivariate systematic risk measurement by Asset Pricing Theory (APT) is suggested.

A potential explanation for the time-series predictability of market returns with dividend yields is the differential tax treatment of capital gains and dividends. This article investigates to what extent the predictability of long-horizon returns can be explained by this tax effect. Assuming that after-tax expected returns are constant, we test the derived relationships between pretax returns and lagged dividend yields with UK data. We also compare the predictability of before-tax long-horizon returns with that of after-tax returns. The results indicate that the tax treatment of dividends does not significantly contribute towards the predictability of stock returns.

This paper examines the relationship between deposit insurance and risk-taking behavior within the credit union industry. Time series tests employing industry average financial ratios for federal and state credit unions did not support the increased risk-taking hypothesis. Although federal credit union capital declined immediately following the adoption of deposit insurance, this was most likely the result of reduced capital requirements, not deposit insurance. Liquidity and loan delinquency ratios had a negative time trend coefficient, implying a decline in risk-taking behavior during the post-insurance period. Cross-sectional test results employing Iowa state-chartered credit union data indicated that insured credit unions were better capitalized and more liquid than their uninsured counterparts. Overall there was no evidence that the adoption of deposit insurance increased the risk-taking behavior of credit unions.

There is a large body of theoretical work that shows that information problems in the capital market have important effects on both the financial structure and the investment policy of the firm. These information problems arise when debt and equity are diffusely held and no individual investor has an incentive to monitor the firm. We test the hypothesis that banks can compensate for capital market imperfections due to asymmetric information. We find that the neoclassical investment model cannot be rejected for a sample of Spanish firms with a close bank relationship while it is rejected for the subsample made up of the remaining firms. An augmented model incorporating borrowing constraints yields the opposite results. These results suggest that banks may play a role in alleviating capital market imperfections in Spain.

We address the problem of selecting portfolios which maximize the ratio of the average excess return to the standard deviation, among all those portfolios which comprise at most a pre-specified number, k, of securities. Under the assumptions of constant pairwise correlations and no short-selling, we argue that the simple ranking procedure of Elton, Gruber, and Padberg effectively solves the problem for all values of k, and that as a function of k, the optimal ratio increases at a decreasing rate. We also clarify why further generalization or extension of our results to other situations is improbable.

This paper presents an equilibrium model of the federal funds market that ties movements in the funds rate to changes in the supply of reserves and to a fixed cost facing banks that borrow at the discount window. It is found that the existence of the fixed cost is capable of explaining a number of features of the funds market. In particular, it is critical for explaining occasional instances of extremely high funds rates. It also provides an explanation for heterogeneous behavior across banks towards the discount window and for higher average funds rates at the end of maintenance periods.

Does Europe offer lessons for the consolidation in US banking? In this paper, it is argued that the political dimension in Europe has led to the protection of national flagships and consolidation mainly on a national scale. Lessons for the US are limited. Rather, the regional expansion observed in US banking may offer valuable lessons for imminent cross-border mergers in European banking.

This paper uses an intermediation model to study the efficiency and welfare implications of both banks' minimum required capital–asset ratio and the regulation that limits, and in some countries forbids, banks' investments in the equity of nonfinancial firms. There are two sources of moral hazard in the model: one between the bank and the provider of deposit insurance, and the other between the bank and an entrepreneur who demands funds to finance an investment project. Among other things, the paper shows that capital regulation improves the bank's stability and can also be Pareto-improving. Equity regulation is never Pareto-improving and does not increase the bank's stability.

This paper examines the relationship between mergers and acquisitions, efficiency, and scale economies in the US life insurance industry. We estimate cost and revenue efficiency over the period 1988–1995 using data envelopment analysis (DEA). The Malmquist methodology is used to measure changes in efficiency over time. We find that acquired firms achieve greater efficiency gains than firms that have not been involved in mergers or acquisitions. Firms operating with non-decreasing returns to scale (NDRS) and financially vulnerable firms are more likely to be acquisition targets. Overall, mergers and acquisitions in the life insurance industry have had a beneficial effect on efficiency.