We examine changes in risk following US bank mergers in the period 1981–2014. Short-run increases in acquirer risk following mergers occur only in the first few mergers undertaken by the same acquirer, and only in systematic risk. The equity volatility of acquirers does not increase. Using a new approach to measure the long-run effect we find that these results persist, consistent with banks maintaining a constant level of total equity risk in the long run. Constant acquirer risk means that all diversification benefits of the mergers are dissipated. We measure the loss of diversification associated with mergers and find it to be 40% of the risk level in 1981. Almost all of this occurred prior to 2004. In addition, there has been a large increase in correlations between the largest banks, much of which has come from sources other than mergers. The results are inconsistent with these mergers being motivated by the ‘too big to fail’ put. They suggest that if one wanted to reduce the risk of the banking system by demerging major banks one would have to reach back to the structure that existed before 2004. Simply reversing recent mergers would not have much effect on stock market measures of risk.

We examine how bank efficiency during normal times affects survival, risk, and profitability during subsequent financial crises using data from five U.S. financial crises and preceding normal times. We find that cost efficiency during normal times helps reduce bank failure probabilities, decrease risk, and enhance profitability during subsequent financial crises, while profit efficiency has limited benefits. Results suggest that cost efficiency better measures management quality, while profit efficiency may partially reflect temporary high returns from risky investments during normal times. Findings have policy implications and imply that improving bank cost efficiency during normal times may promote better financial crisis performance.

Lenders reduce their monitoring efforts after hedging their credit risk exposure through credit default swap (CDS) contracts, which are akin to insurance against borrowers’ adverse credit events. In this study, we examine whether, upon observing the reduced lender monitoring following CDS trading, shareholders demand that borrowing firms invest in more aggressive tax planning strategies, which were previously constrained by risk-averse lenders. Using a difference-in-differences design that exploits the variation in timing of the inception of CDS trading, we document that borrowers exhibit greater tax avoidance after the inception of CDS trading. Consistent with shareholders stepping up their demands post-CDS, we find that the increase in tax avoidance is stronger for (i) firms with more powerful and influential shareholders, as measured by dedicated institutional investors, (ii) firms with stronger shareholder defenders, as measured by board independence and board size, and (iii) firms with more strategic default options. We also find that borrowers with higher levels of tax avoidance are less likely to file for bankruptcy in the future. Our findings are robust to a battery of sensitivity checks, including controlling for cost of debt and endogeneity, as well as using alternative measures of tax avoidance.

Using European stock data from two different venues and time periods for which we can identify each trade's aggressor, we test the performance of the bulk volume classification (Easley et al. (2016); BVC) algorithm. BVC is data efficient, but may identify trade aggressors less accurately than “bulk” versions of traditional trade-level algorithms. BVC-estimated trade flow is the only algorithm related to proxies of informed trading, however. This is because traditional algorithms are designed to find individual trade aggressors, but we find that trade aggressor no longer captures information. Finally, we find that after calibrating BVC to trading characteristics in out-of-sample data, it is better able to detect information and to identify trade aggressors. In the new era of fast trading, sophisticated investors, and smart order execution, BVC appears to be the most versatile algorithm.

We document significantly lower valuations for government contractors in the United States. While contracting with government agencies reduces firms’ cost of equity, it significantly lowers their sales growth. These findings are contingent on economic conditions; negative valuations dissipate as operating performance improves during economy- and industry-wide recessions. The overall negative valuation effect of government contracts holds only for government contractors in strategically unimportant industries, as strategically important contractors have higher valuations, driven by better operating performance regardless of economic conditions. This is the first study examining the relationship between government procurement and corporate valuation. It also adds to the growing body of literature on politically connected firms by analyzing government contractors as a related‑but‑separate channel of governmental influence on the corporate world.

Crowdfunding platform due diligence comprises background checks, site visits, credit checks, cross-checks, account monitoring, and third party proof on funding projects. We evaluate the factors associated with platforms’ compliance expenses, and their due diligence application. We find that due diligence is related to legislation requirement, platform size, and type or complexity of crowdfunding campaigns. In addition, we find that platforms applying due diligence provide more services to project issuers and funders. Furthermore, due diligence is associated with higher percentage of successful campaigns, more fund contributors, and larger amount of capital raised on platforms. Our analyses are supported by platform-level data, covering the period 2014–2017.

Contains fulltext : 199743.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)

We show that the returns of individual stocks become more synchronous with the aggregate market during periods of high investor sentiment. We also document that the effect of sentiment on stock return synchronicity is especially pronounced for small, young, volatile, non-dividend-paying and low-priced stocks. This ‘difference in difference’ suggests that stocks with these characteristics are affected more by sentiment—consistent with previous studies. Our results support the hypothesis that greater constraints on arbitrage and the prevalence of sentiment-driven demand during periods of high sentiment lead to increased comovement among stocks.

This study presents a theoretical model that links chief executive officer (CEO) overconfidence to the value loss of corporate diversification. Consistent with the model's prediction, the findings show that diversified firms run by overconfident CEOs experience value loss compared to diversified firms run by their rational counterparts. Empirically, the value loss is economically significant and ranges between 12.5% and 14.1%. In addition, the model predicts heightened corporate refocusing activity by overconfident CEOs who pursued diversified investments in the past once realized returns fail to match initial expectations. The empirical odds of corporate refocusing decisions are 67% to 98% higher when past diversifications are undertaken by overconfident rather than rational CEOs. Another prediction of the model is that overconfident CEOs exhibit preference for diversified investments, especially in the presence of ample internal funds. This prediction is also strongly supported by the data. Overall, this study proposes CEO overconfidence as a unified and consistent explanation of why firms pursue value-destructive corporate diversification policies and later adopt refocusing policies aiming to restore value.

Collectively organized pension plans must increasingly demonstrate that the risk preferences of their members are adequately reflected in the plans’ asset allocations. However, whether funds should elicit individual members’ risk preferences to achieve this goal, or whether they can rely on other indicators, such as socio-demographics, remains unclear. To address this question, we apply a tailored augmented lottery choice method to elicit individual pension income risk preferences from 7,894 members from five different pension plans. The results show that member risk preferences are strongly heterogeneous and can only partially be predicted from individual and plan characteristics. Differences in risk preference imply different optimal asset allocations. We find large welfare losses for heterogeneous members in pension plans with their current asset allocation because these allocations are safer than implied by members’ preferences. We provide a framework for pension plans to gauge the need to elicit risk preferences among their members.