The introduction to this special issue reviews the literature on the industrial organization of securities market clearing and settlement, covering institutional, theoretical, and empirical contributions, including both papers in this special issue and previous studies. Clearing and settlement is an important but under-researched network industry. Recent theoretical research has characterized the network externalities in clearing and settlement and explored the economic efficiency of various alternative industrial structures. Initial empirical research has identified substantial economies of both scale and scope and important interactions with trading platforms. More research is needed to elaborate these theoretical insights and improve our understanding of the economics of this major industry.

The developed world exhibits substantial but poorly understood differences in the efficiency and quality of low value payment services. This paper compares payment arrangements in the UK, Norway, Sweden, and Finland, and discusses the impact of network effects on incentives to adopt new payments technology. A model is presented, in which private benefits for investment in shared inter-bank payments infrastructure are weak. In contrast, due to ‘account externalities’, there are strong incentives for investment in intra-bank payment systems. These two features, distinguishing bank payments from other network industries, can help explain some of the observed cross-country differences in payment arrangements.

This paper contrasts the conventional interpretation of prudential capital regulation as a system of ex ante enforcement (`hard wired') with an alternative interpretation as a system of sanctions for ex post violation (`incentive based'). Under the incentive based interpretation risk-weightings affect portfolio choice only when assets are illiquid. Under both interpretations, the medium term impact on portfolio allocation depends upon the relative costs of debt and equity finance. Viewing enforcement as incentive based suggests there is relatively less need to match risk weightings accurately to portfolio risk.

Using an unbalanced panel of accounting data from 1997 to 2004 and controlling for individual bank costs and risk, we find capital buffers of the banks in the EU15 have a significant negative co-movement with the cycle. For banks in the accession countries there is significant positive co-movement. Capital buffers of commercial and savings banks, and of large banks, exhibit negative co-movement. Those of co-operative and smaller banks exhibit positive co-movement. Speeds of adjustment are fairly slow. We interpret these results and discuss policy implications, noting that negative co-movement of capital buffers will exacerbate the pro-cyclical impact of Basel II.