Using a sample of 2198 completed M&A transactions between 1994 and 2010 in which both target and acquirer are public US firms supplemented with hand-collected data for target CEO retention, we uncover a significantly negative relation between target CEO retention and takeover premiums received by target shareholders. Further, when the target CEO was not retained, we document a significantly negative relation between the relative importance of the severance pay received by the target CEO and takeover premium. Taken together, our findings, which hold in various robustness tests, suggest that target CEOs bargain shareholder value for personal benefits during corporate takeovers. Our findings have important policy implications for takeover disclosures.

Using options-implied variance, a forward-looking measure of conditional variance, we revisit the debate on the idiosyncratic risk-return relation. In both cross-sectional (for individual stocks) and time-series (for the market index) regressions, we find a negative relation between options-implied variance and future stock returns. Consistent with Miller’s (1977) divergence of opinion hypothesis, the negative relation gets stronger (1) for stocks with more stringent short-sale constraints or (2) when shorting stocks becomes more difficult. Moreover, the negative correlation of realized idiosyncratic variance or analyst forecast dispersion with future stock returns mainly reflects their close correlation with our conditional idiosyncratic variance measure.

This paper shows that the stock return predictability of analysts’ earnings forecast dispersion is driven by the information content of dispersion about future firm profitability. Greater dispersion predicts lower future profitability, and the return predictability of dispersion disappears after controlling for future profitability. We propose disclosure manipulation as an explanation for the relation between dispersion and future profitability. Disclosure quality is inversely related to forecast dispersion. Moreover, the return predictability of dispersion decreases in disclosure quality. Our results are robust to the consideration of previously suggested explanations for the dispersion anomaly.

We conjecture that a firm's organization capital (OC) has a substitution effect on its executive pay-for-performance sensitivity (PPS) and empirically document a robust and significant substitution effect of OC on executive PPS. We use state-level unemployment insurance benefits as an instrumental variable for OC and show that the documented OC-PPS substitution effect is likely causal. Results are also robust to a stacked difference-in-differences estimation approach based on a quasi-natural experiment of exogenous CEO turnovers due to health-related issues. Our findings strongly suggest that greater OC substitutes for costly executive incentive compensation to sustain firm productivity and increase shareholder wealth.

Using the 2002 Sarbanes–Oxley reform as an exogenous disclosure shock, we find that high, relative to low, volatility firms opt for lower levels of information availability pre reform and experience increases in information availability, CEO turnover-to-performance sensitivity, myopic behavior, CEO compensation with a structure tilted towards more cash pay, and a reduction in firm value post the reform. Our findings suggest that mandating high levels of information availability across the board increases managerial evaluation risk and produces additional agency costs for firms with volatile performance.