This paper investigates the source of price momentum in the stock market using information from options markets. We provide direct evidence of the gradual information diffusion model in Hong and Stein (1999): momentum profits are larger for stocks whose information diffuses slowly into the stock market. We exploit the options markets to identify stocks with slow information diffusion speed. As informed traders trade options to realize the information that has not been fully incorporated in the stock price, we are able to enhance the momentum strategy by selecting winner/loser stocks with high growth/large drop in call option implied volatility. Our empirical strategy generates a risk-adjusted alpha of 1.8% per month over the 1996–2011 period, during which the simple momentum strategy fails to perform. The results are robust to the impact of earnings announcement, transaction costs, industry concentration, and choice of options’ moneyness and time-to-maturity. Finally, our finding is not driven by existing stock- or option-related characteristics that are known to improve momentum.

We set out in this study to investigate whether bancassurance business leads to improvements in the efficiency and profitability of banks. We examine the positive impacts on the system using actual data provided by a unique database on banks engaging in bancassurance business in Taiwan between 2004 and 2012. Our results reveal that banks with greater involvement in bancassurance business generally tend to experience improvements in their efficiency, and thus also accrue greater profits. Our empirical results provide evidence to support that bancassurance business offers substantial benefits for banks, ultimately leading to an increase in shareholder value. Finally, our results also reveal that the adoption of a diversification strategy in bancassurance can impact bank performance.

Liquidity plays an important role in financial markets, especially during a financial crisis. New Basel III regulatory framework highlights the importance of liquidity risk management implemented by financial institutions. Moreover, updated International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) require the improvements about fair value measurements and reinforce existing principles for disclosures about the liquidity risk associated with financial instruments. Using the liquidity discount model of Chen (2012), we are able to empirically classify Taiwan's financial institutions into three liquidity categories: safe, crisis contagious and vulnerable. Our findings can serve as an early warning signal for liquidity calamity. In addition, we investigate what factors affect firm-specific liquidity discounts for these institutions and conduct a sub-period analysis, which examines whether there is significant liquidity discounts changes before and after the 2008 financial crisis. We find that liquidity discounts change substantially during the financial crisis. Furthermore, we find that liquidity discounts can be attributed to some firm-specific performance.

Using a sample of Chinese Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) from 2006 to 2011, we document that politically connected (PC) underwriters increase the likelihood of clients’ IPO applications being approved by the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC). We further show that PC underwriters charge premium underwriting fees. Consistent with the rent-seeking argument, we find that minority shareholders’ interests may be impaired as indicated by post-IPO underperformance. We do not detect significant differences in the underpricing of IPO deals underwritten by PC versus non-PC investment banks.

We construct a unique political connection index to capture variations in the strength of firm political relations in China. The index incorporates various channels through which a firm's executives, chairperson, directors, and other senior officers are politically connected with government officials and bureaucrats. Overall, there is a negative relation between our index and firm value for the full sample, but such negative relation mainly exists for state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and it becomes positive for non-SOEs. Furthermore, close examination shows an inverted U-shaped relation between political connections and firm value for the full sample in general and for non-SOEs in particular: Firm value increases initially at a lower level of connections and then begins to decrease at a higher level. The findings are consistent with the different business objectives and motivations of SOEs and non-SOEs in seeking political connections. Finally, our findings are robust after controlling for potential endogeneity and using an alternative headcount index construction method.

This paper addresses the impact of foreign ownership on the risk-taking behavior of banks. Using bank-level panel data of more than 1300 commercial banks in 32 emerging economies during 2000–2013, we find that foreign owned banks take on more risk than their domestic counterparts. We further examine several factors that may potentially contribute to foreign banks’ differentiated riskiness from four perspectives, namely, foreign banks’ informational disadvantages, agency problems, the contagious effect of parent banks’ financial conditions and the disparity between home and host markets. We find supportive evidence that these factors play a significant role in affecting foreign banks’ risk-taking.