This paper identifies the put-option, liquidity availability proportion, and shadow liquidity risk premia embedded within commercial mortgage backed securities (CMBS) using reduced form and structural generalization models. These risk values are then interpreted as trading signals which are tested with automated trading strategies that buy undervalued and sell overvalued CMBS from November 2007 through June 2015. All three signals generate substantial positive trading profits in testing for the reduced form model but not for the structural generalization. The risk signals constructed independently of market pricing provide more profitable automated trading insights than those constructed from interactions between modeled risk measures and market spreads. In my tests of the information content of the risk signals with respect to future macroeconomic indicators, I find statistically significant evidence in keeping with recent studies. While I cannot reject CMBS efficiency, this paper’s disclosure of new risk measures, the profitability of automated strategies based on those risk measures, and the statistical significance of their forward guidance capabilities, together contributes to our understanding of CMBS risk and the credit spread puzzle debate.

Irreversible investment and the attendant concept of real-option value have been well discussed. Complete reversibility has been frequently invoked but less studied, especially for the case of lumpy investment typically considered in capital budgeting. We examine a simple lumpy investment problem for the full range, from complete irreversibility to completely reversibility, with a focus on the latter. The optimal stopping rules under complete reversibility are to invest when the project generates enough net cash flow to cover Jorgenson’s opportunity cost of investment and to disinvest when it does not. Given the static nature of these rules, net present value as a timing criterion under reversibility is not pertinent. Investments that are partially reversible have much in common with completely irreversible investments but nothing in common with completely reversible investments. The case of reversible investment provides a foil for understanding that the distinguishing feature of investment as treated in corporate finance is that it entails at least some irreversibility.

Prior research documents a negative aggregate earnings-returns relation. In contrast, we posit that the sign of the relation varies, depending upon the macroeconomic and financial market conditions that exist in the earnings announcement quarter. We argue that the existing macroeconomic and financial market conditions influence market participants’ frame of reference, which in turn affects whether they interpret aggregate earnings surprises to be informative about the expected inflation component of the discount rate, the market risk premium component of the discount rate, or aggregate future cash flows. Consistent with this, we find that the sign of the aggregate earnings-returns relation changes numerous times across our sample period. We also find that market participants interpret aggregate earnings to be informative about changes in expected inflation (market risk premium) when the sign of the aggregate earnings-returns relation is negative (positive). Finally, we identify macroeconomic and financial market conditions under which the aggregate earnings-returns relation is more (less) likely to be negative (positive).

We provide the first in-depth examination of exchange-traded funds (ETFs) within actively managed mutual fund (AMMF) portfolios to better understand why AMMFs make substantial investments in passive ETFs. We examine the association between holding ETF positions and AMMF performance, as well as indirect measures of performance, including market timing, flow management, and cash holdings. We find that over one-third of AMMFs take an ETF position between 2004 and 2015. Our results indicate that AMMFs allocating large portions of their portfolio to ETFs perform worse, by between 0.41% and 1.63% annually using various performance measures. These AMMFs also exhibit worse market timing and hold more cash. In contrast, AMMFs that hold ETFs in small amounts have similar characteristics to non-user AMMFs. Therefore, the act of holding an ETF does not signal inferior ability, however, taking large ETF positions does.

We examine the effect of the full set of bank capital regulations (capital stringency) on loan growth, using bank-level data for a maximum of 125 countries over the period 1998–2011. Contrary to standard theoretical considerations, we find that overall capital stringency only has a weak negative effect on loan growth. In fact, this effect is completely offset if banks hold moderately high levels of capital. Interestingly, the components of capital stringency that have the strongest negative effect on loan growth are those related to the prevention of banks to use as capital borrowed funds and assets other than cash or government securities. In contrast, compliance with Basel guidelines in using Basel- and credit-risk weights has a much less potent effect on loan growth.