This paper documents predictable time-variation in the real return beta of US Treasury Inflation Protected Securities (TIPS) and in the Sharpe ratios of both indexed and conventional bonds. The conditional mean and volatility of both bonds and their conditional correlation first are estimated from predetermined variables. These estimates then are used to compute conditional real return betas and Sharpe ratios. The time-variation in real return betas and the correlation between TIPS and nominal bonds coincides with major developments in the fixed-income market. One implication of this predictability is that portfolio managers can assess more efficiently the risk of investing in TIPS versus conventional bonds. Conditional Sharpe ratios indicate that over the sample period, TIPS had superior volatility-adjusted returns relative to nominal bonds. This finding is striking in view of the absence of a major inflation scare during the sample period from February 1997 through August 2001, but is loosely consistent with the possibility that TIPS elevated rather than reduced Treasury borrowing costs. On the other hand, mean–variance spanning tests indicate that TIPS did not enhance the mean–variance efficiency of diversified portfolios.

We examine the impact of changes in Greek sovereign yield spreads on abnormal returns of financial sector stocks for a sample of Eurozone countries, during the Greek debt crisis. We find that increases in yield spreads are associated with negative abnormal returns on financial stocks in the Portugal, Spain and Netherlands. These abnormal returns are driven in part by ratings downgrades and other unfavorable news announcements about Greece. We isolate the effects of known transmission channels–impairment of financial firms’ asset base due to cross-holdings of Greek bonds, from increases in domestic interest rates and higher funding costs. Our analysis indicates that news events lead to spillovers in excess of what can be explained by these channels of transmission.

Whether, and how, the introduction of deposit insurance affects non-bank financial market development depends on whether banks and non-bank financial markets are substitutes or complements and theory has conflicting views. Using data on 134 countries over a 28-year period and several identification strategies we find that the introduction of deposit insurance retards the equity market, the non-bank depositaries sector, and the banking sector when law and order is weak. While strong law and order mitigates this effect, it does not lead to a positive outcome for all markets. For non-bank financial markets, the effect is greater in the long run so that while deposit insurance increases banking sector development in the long run, it retards non-bank financial markets regardless of the level of law and order. Finally, several design features exacerbate the negative outcomes. Our results have important policy implications for implementing or altering deposit insurance schemes.

We examine the impact of rivals’ competitive activities on firms’ quantity-of-capital constraints in 60 countries. Prior work shows that competition increases the costs of debt and equity, which reduce the economic profit from investment. Capital constraints, however, may prevent firms from exploiting all positive NPV projects. Using unique survey data and several econometric techniques, we address endogeneity problems that affect both capital constraints and rivals’ competitive activities. We find that rivals’ competitive activities are positively associated with firms’ capital constraints and are more strongly correlated with capital constraints than banking sector competition. We also show that quantity-of-capital constraints are negatively related to firm growth, incremental to the cost of capital.