We investigate the abnormal returns and market-based risk effects of four Federal Reserve Board decisions to allow bank holding companies to engage in investment banking through Section 20 subsidiaries. Positive abnormal returns for commercial banks were observed for initial, limited powers granted by the Federal Reserve. However, authorization to engage in underwriting corporate debt and equity and subsequent expansion of potential revenues from underwritings produced negative abnormal returns and increases in risk.

We compare underwriting performance by commercial bank-affiliated firms (Section 20s) and traditional investment banks over the period 1995–1998. We find that gross spreads are lower in the case of Section 20 underwritings, but that yield spreads are not. Our sample includes a substantial number of observations following changes in Federal Reserve policies that substantially eased restrictions on Section 20 activities in early 1997. Our findings differ somewhat from results in the literature that focused on periods prior to these policy changes. We find, for example, no evidence that a prior commercial bank lending relationship influences underwriting yields for any type of issue. Our results also fail to confirm earlier evidence that collective Section 20 underwritings produce a favorable competitive effect on gross spreads and yield spreads. We find substantial evidence that both the underwriting mix and the underwriting process are relevant to the behavior of gross spreads and yield spreads over the sample period.

The recent repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act in the US has cleared the way for commercial banks to enter the securities underwriting business. Many of the concerns that resulted in the original passage of the Glass–Steagall Act, however, still exist. One of these is the possible conflict of interest a universal bank faces. This paper provides evidence on this issue from the experience of Canada following its removal of restrictions on chartered bank ownership of investment dealers. Both ex ante bond yield comparisons between commercial and investment bank underwritten issues and equity price reactions to bond issue announcements provide no evidence of a conflict of interest.

This study puts forth stationarity considerations in explaining the observed breakdown between aggregate Discount Window borrowing and the spread between the Federal Funds rate and the discount rate during the post-1987 period. Tests with biweekly data indicate stationarity for adjustment borrowing, but cannot reject the unit root for the spread. The Goodfriend–Dutkowsky dynamic implicit cost formulation can accommodate the contrasting stationarity properties. Structural restrictions are compatible with stationary borrowing and a stationary or near integrated spread. While empirical findings from the static model indicate greater bank reluctance to borrow over time, the dynamic model gives considerably less support.

We provide evidence regarding the extent to which commercial banking organizations that have entered investment banking have adopted pay-performance compensation systems that are like those used by investment banks. We find that pay-performance sensitivities for these banks once they begin securities underwriting are very similar to the sensitivities for commercial banks that have chosen not to enter investment banking. We also find that pay-performance sensitivities for both types of commercial banks are less than for investment banks.