Past studies find abnormal returns to buying after repurchase program announcements. We analyze the profitability of trading after both program announcements and individual repurchase trade publication using different trading strategies – market and limit orders. The analysis of trades is possible because of a unique Canadian data set. The highest abnormal returns are earned by companies on their own repurchase trades which benefits the non-tendering shareholders. For the public investor, we find no strategies that, in practice, would earn abnormal returns to buying after program announcements. However, there is qualified evidence of abnormal returns to a limit order strategy following publication of individual repurchase trades.

This paper analyses changes in capitalization and control of dual class firms before and after IPO. The results indicate that the combination of a large controlling shareholder with family interests, rather than concentrated ownership per se, leads to dual class capitalization. During the first 15 years post-IPO, voting leverage continuously increases as the dual class firms issue more restricted than superior voting shares. However, control changes are equally frequent for dual and single class firms suggesting that dual class capitalization is not used to unduly entrench management. We document disputes between restricted and superior voting shareholders to illustrate the potential corporate governance problems which are associated with dual class capitalization. As a result of these disputes, investor interest in dual class equity has decreased and there is a recent trend toward reclassification back into single class equity.

This paper examines transactions data regarding the market's reaction to 258 takeover announcements on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSE) from 1977 to 1989. The study analyzes volatility and volume of target firm's stock during the first trading day following a takeover announcement. A cross-sectional analysis relates this intraday volatility and volume to various aspects of a takeover announcement that proxy for the certainty of payoff to shareholders. Post-announcement volatility is highest when takeover announcements involve share exchange bids which are contested. Trading volume is highest when bids are contested and involve a large initial price change.