This paper investigates the relevance of non-traditional activities in the estimation of bank efficiency levels using a sample of 752 publicly quoted commercial banks from 87 countries around the world, allowing comparison of the impact of such activities under different levels of economic development, geographical regions and other country characteristics. We estimate both cost and profit efficiency of banks using a traditional function that considers loans and other earnings assets as the only outputs, and two additional functions to account for non-traditional activities, one with off-balance sheet (OBS) items and the other with non-interest income as an additional output. Controlling for cross-country differences in regulatory and environmental conditions, we find that, on average, cost efficiency increases irrespective of whether we use OBS or non-interest income, although the results for profit efficiency are mixed. Our results also reveal that while the inclusion of non-traditional outputs does not alter the directional impact of environmental variables on bank inefficiency, regulations that restrict bank activities and enhance monitoring and supervision provisions improve both cost and profit efficiency.

We examine, for the first time in the literature, the impact of social capital on the cost of bank equity worldwide. We reach two interesting conclusions. First, consistent with the view that the social capital of a region can constrain managerial opportunistic behavior, enhance the flow of information, and mitigate moral hazard and agency concerns, we find that banks from countries with higher social capital operate with lower cost of equity. Second, consistent with the view of a substitutional relationship between formal and informal institutions we find that the association of social capital with the cost of bank equity becomes weaker in countries with strong formal institutions. The results hold while controlling for numerous bank-level and country-level characteristics, as well as when we account for endogeneity with the use of an instrumental variables approach.

There exists a lively debate as for the appropriate architecture of the financial supervision regime, with a long list of theoretical advantages and disadvantages associated with each one of its key dimensions. The present study investigates whether and how bank profit efficiency is influenced by the central bank’s involvement in financial supervision, the unification of financial authorities, and the independence of the central bank. The results show that efficiency decreases as the number of the financial sectors that are supervised by the central bank increases. Additionally, banks operating in countries with greater unification of supervisory authorities are less profit efficient. Finally, central bank independence has a negative impact on bank profit efficiency.

Over the last fifteen years, many countries introduced reforms into the supervisory architecture of their financial sector. However, there is no evidence on whether specific supervisory arrangements were more successful than others during the crisis. Empirical evidence on the topic is in general scarce and there are reasonable theoretical arguments for and against alternative approaches. Similarly, while the effect of central bank independence on price stability has attracted a lot of attention, our knowledge with regards to its effect on bank soundness remains limited. Using a large sample of commercial banks operating in various countries over the period 2000–2011, this paper investigates whether and how bank soundness is influenced by central bank independence, central bank involvement in prudential regulation, and supervisory unification. We find that central bank independence exercises a positive impact on bank soundness, which in the case of smaller banks is enhanced during the crisis. Supervisory unification and the central bank involvement appear to mitigate the adverse effects of the crisis. The power of the supervisory authorities and bank size also appear to be conditional factors.

High secrecy cultures are characterized by a preference for confidentiality and non-disclosure of information. This study documents the impact of cultural differences in secrecy on firms’ access to credit. We use data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys for a large sample of firms operating in 35 countries from 2010 to 2019. We show that firms operating in countries with higher levels of secrecy are less likely to apply for credit when they need it—they are more discouraged—and also less likely to receive credit when they do apply—they are more rationed. The underlying economic channels are greater opacity and corruption in cultures with high secrecy. The effect of cultural secrecy on credit discouragement and credit rationing is moderated by trust in banks, interpersonal trust, and firms’ financial dependence on external sources. We control for several potential alternative drivers and conduct several robustness tests. The results confirm that firms have better access to credit in cultures that promote transparency and information disclosure.

This study investigates the relationship between the culture of secrecy and stock price comovement using a large sample of firms in 49 countries over the period 1990 to 2019. We find that stock prices in secretive societies comove more than stock prices in less secretive societies. This higher comovement occurs primarily because idiosyncratic volatility is lower. We attribute this finding to cultural biases in secretive societies which deter investors’ information-seeking behavior. To support these conjectures, we provide evidence of stronger mean reversals (less informed trading) in these societies. Our results persist when we account for cross-country differences in firms’ liquidity and information asymmetry, and when we control for cash flow uncertainty. Finally, the enforcement of insider trading laws in secretive countries is associated with less privately informed trading and lower idiosyncratic volatility.