This paper examines the responsiveness of external bank liabilities to deposit insurance policies for a sample of developed countries. External bank liabilities held by non-banks are found to increase after the introduction of explicit deposit insurance. Deposit insurance schemes tend to exclude interbank deposits from coverage and the response of external interbank liabilities to deposit insurance appears to be varied. Neither external non-bank nor external interbank liabilities are found to be materially affected by deposit insurance design. This suggests that international competition in the area of deposit insurance design – as possible under the EU deposit insurance directive of 1994 – would be fruitless.

Deteriorating public finances around the world raise doubts about countries’ abilities to bail out their largest banks. For an international sample of banks, this paper investigates the impact of bank size and government deficits on bank stock prices and CDS spreads. We find that a bank’s market-to-book value is negatively related to the size of its liabilities-to-GDP ratio, especially in countries running large public deficits. CDS spreads appear to decrease with stronger public finances. These results suggest that systemically important banks can increase their value by downsizing or splitting up, especially if they are located in countries with weak public finances. We document that banks’ average liabilities-to-GDP ratio reached a peak in 2007 before a significant drop in 2008, which could reflect these private incentives to downsize.

This paper examines how the capital structure of non-financial firms is affected by international variation in bank regulation. A concise model yields an estimating equation that relates a firm's capital structure to bank regulatory variables and their interactions with the tax rate reflecting the tax deductibility of interest. We identify an effect of bank regulation on leverage by considering establishments of the same multinational firm located in different countries. Our results indicate that capital regulation stringency and official supervisory power are negatively related to firm leverage, while restrictions on non-lending activities and on financial conglomerates vary positively with firm leverage. High tax rates mitigate these effects.

Using 7900 bank observations from 80 countries for the 1988–1995 period, this paper examines the extent and effect of foreign presence in domestic banking markets. We investigate how net interest margins, overhead, taxes paid, and profitability differ between foreign and domestic banks. We find that foreign banks have higher profits than domestic banks in developing countries, but the opposite is the case for developed countries. Estimation results suggest that an increased presence of foreign banks is associated with a reduction in profitability and margins for domestic banks.

This paper finds that lending by state banks is less procyclical than lending by private banks, especially in countries with good governance. Lending by state banks in high income countries is even countercyclical. On the liability side, state banks expand their total liabilities and, in particular, their non-deposit liabilities relatively little during booms. Public banks also report loan non-performance more evenly over the business cycle. Overall our results suggest that state banks can play a useful role in stabilizing credit over the business cycle as well as during periods of financial instability. However, the track record of state banks in credit allocation remains quite poor, questioning the wisdom of using state banks as a short term countercyclical tool.

This paper is the first to show that financial institutions may be effectively undercapitalized as a result of incomplete consolidation of minority ownership. Using two approaches – consolidating the minority-owned affiliates with the parent or deducting equity investments in minority ownership from the parent's capital – we find that the effective capitalization ratios of small US bank holding companies (BHCs) are substantially lower than the reported ratios. Empirical evidence suggests that the effectively lower capitalization ratios are associated with higher riskiness at the BHC level. Capital adjustments following pro forma consolidation better capture the additional risks than capital adjustments in the form of equity deductions for investments in minority-owned affiliates. These findings have important implications for the regulation of bank capital.