We investigate how the state's intervention in the investment decisions of Chinese local SOEs is affected by corporate control distance in the form of pyramidal layers and the geographical distance between the SOEs and their government controllers. Although both the corporate control distance and the geographical distance affect the state's costs of acquiring information about the SOEs, the former is created intentionally by the state to delegate decision rights, and the latter is largely exogenous. We find that local SOEs’ investment efficiency is positively associated with the extensiveness of pyramids but negatively related to the geographical distance. The positive impact of pyramid-building on investment efficiency remains strong even when information costs captured by the geographical distance are low. However, the two distance measures lose their impact on investment efficiency when local governments reclaim control through a vertical interlock of chairman. Our results indicate that the credibility of the government's intention to delegate decision rights is vital to the SOEs’ efficiency when government intervention is the norm in China.

We investigate the patterns and performance of banks’ investments in fintech ventures in the United States. We document that banks, as compared to independent venture capitalists (IVCs), invest a larger proportion in fintech startups and achieve a higher IPO exit rate. The better exit performance is neither explained by banks’ tendency to invest in later-round or larger deals, nor contributed by banks’ following successful peer IVCs. Banks’ outperformance is mainly concentrated in fin-native fintech startups and those whose business operations overlap with banks’ core business segments, which is consistent with the corporate venture capital (CVC) literature and the conjecture that banks possess unique industry expertise that facilitates their selection of fintech startups. In addition, banks participate more on the boards of fintech startups than of other ventures, implying that the better investment performance is not purely driven by selection.