The empirical literature on credit risk has relied mostly on the corporate bond market to estimate losses in the event of default. The reason for this is that, as bank loans are private instruments, few data on loan losses are publicly available. The contribution of this paper is to apply mortality analysis to a unique set of micro-data on defaulted bank loans of a European bank. The empirical results relate to the timing of recoveries on bad and doubtful bank loans, the distribution of cumulative recovery rates, their economic determinants and the direct costs incurred by that bank on recoveries on bad and doubtful loans.

The aim of our paper is to price credit derivatives written on a single name when this name is a bank. Indeed, due to the special structure of the balance sheet of a bank and to the interconnections with other institutions of the financial system, the standard pricing formulas do not apply and their use can imply severe mispricing. The pricing of credit derivatives written on a single bank name requires a joint analysis of the risks of all banks directly or indirectly interconnected with the bank of interest. Each name cannot be priced in isolation, but the banking system must be treated as a whole. It is necessary to analyze the contagion of losses among banks, especially the equilibrium of joint defaults and recovery rates at liquidation time. We show the existence and uniqueness of such an equilibrium. Then the standard pricing formulas are modified by adding a premium to capture the contagion effects.

This paper examines the relative efficiency of UK credit unions. Radial and non-radial measures of input cost efficiency plus associated scale efficiency measures are computed for a selection of input output specifications. Both measures highlighted that UK credit unions have considerable scope for efficiency gains. It was mooted that the documented high levels of inefficiency may be indicative of the fact that credit unions, based on clearly defined and non-overlapping common bonds, are not in competition with each other for market share. Credit unions were also highlighted as suffering from a considerable degree of scale inefficiency with the majority of scale inefficient credit unions subject to decreasing returns to scale. The latter aspect highlights that the UK Government's goal of larger credit unions must be accompanied by greater regulatory freedom if inefficiency is to be avoided. One of the advantages of computing non-radial measures is that an insight into potential over- or under-expenditure on specific inputs can be obtained through a comparison of the non-radial measure of efficiency with the associated radial measure. Two interesting findings emerged, the first that UK credit unions over-spend on dividend payments and the second that they under-spend on labour costs.