We study the role of banking relationships in IPO underwriting. When a firm in Japan goes public, it can engage an investment bank that is related through a common main bank, or can select an alternative investment bank. The main bank relationship can be an efficient way for the investment bank to acquire information generated by the main bank, but may give rise to conflicts of interest. We find that main bank relationships give small issuers increased access to equity capital markets, but that issuers of large IPOs often switch to non-related investment banks that are capable of managing large offerings. While investment banks seek to exploit bargaining power with related issuers, issuers respond to expected high issue cost by switching to non-related investment banks. The net result is that total issue costs through related and non-related investment banks are similar. With respect to aftermarket performance and use of proceeds, we find no evidence of conflict of interest or self-dealing for either the main bank or the investment bank.

We use the IPOs of supply-chain partners as precipitating events and test for positive spillovers on private firms (the “IPO spillover hypothesis”). A trading partner’s IPO may benefit its suppliers through increased demand and its customers by reducing an input-related growth constraint. A newly public firm may also transmit additional liquidity to trading partners through trade credit practices. Using Japanese data on important relationships between IPO firms and their private suppliers and customers, we find that suppliers and customers experience significantly higher rates of growth in revenue, cash balances, and PP&E than do other private firms. The paper appears to be the first to document real and financial effects of positive liquidity shocks on supply-chain partners.