Existing research on executive stock options mainly focuses on total risk when studying risk incentives. In this study, we use a GARCH option pricing framework to show that the incentive effects of executive stock options depend on the composition of risk. Controlling for total risk, the value of executive stock options increases with systematic risk and this effect is stronger when the total risk is low. Thus, when firms grant standard or non-indexed options, CEOs will have incentives to increase systematic risk even when the total risk remains constant. In contrast, indexed options will provide CEOs with incentives to reduce systematic risk. We therefore conclude that an optimal mix of indexed and non-indexed option grants will provide CEOs with incentives to take the desired level of systematic risk.

A multiperiod model is developed to measure the costs posed to the guaranty fund in a setting that incorporates risk-based capital regulations, interest rate risk and the possibility of catastrophic losses. The guaranty contract is modeled as a put option on the asset of the insurance company with a stochastic strike price and an uncertain maturity. The impacts of the key factors of this model are examined numerically and shown to make material differences in the costs to the guaranty fund.