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Regulator supervisory power and bank loan contracting

Journal of Banking & Finance 2021 126, 106062
Using a sample from 38 economies, we examine the relation between bank regulators’ supervisory power and loan spreads. We find that loans issued by banks in economies with more powerful supervisors have higher spreads. The positive association is more pronounced when firms have lower credit quality, when the relationships between firms and banks are less established, when syndicate loans involve fewer lenders, and when lead banks have a riskier profile. Further analyses reveal that loans issued by banks that operate under more powerful supervisors have smaller size and shorter maturity, and the loans are more likely to have collateral requirements and restrictive covenants. Overall, these results suggest that stronger supervisory power of bank regulators affects loan contracting by mitigating lenders’ excessive risk taking.

Incentives and culture in risk compliance

Journal of Banking & Finance 2019 107, 105611 open access
In the finance industry, risk compliance has become an important issue after numerous policy violations resulting in significant costs for financial institutions and society as a whole. We run a lab-in-the-field experiment with 269 finance professionals, to investigate the effects of financial incentives and workplace culture on risk compliance. Relative to variable remuneration (linked to expected profits), fixed remuneration increases the proportion of people complying by as much as 25.1 percentage points. This is achieved with no diminution in productivity. Relative to a profit-focused workplace culture, a risk-focused workplace culture increases the proportion of people complying by 16.3 percentage points.

Deferred pay: Compliance and productivity with self-selection

Journal of Banking & Finance 2023 154, 106657 open access
Financial services misconduct is a concern for many stakeholders and deferred variable remuneration has been proposed as an antidote. The implications for attracting/retaining productive individuals are unknown. This study investigates deferred payment mechanisms through experiments in student and professional samples, taking account of self-selection effects. We confirm that the introduction of deferrals would reduce misconduct through better monitoring. While some individuals eschew deferred payment, even in the presence of a deferral premium, productive individuals are under-represented in this group. Productive individuals are more likely to select deferred variable remuneration, so productivity outcomes are equal to or superior to alternative treatments.