Debates on the double taxation of dividends and corporate income have been long-standing. If double taxation were to be avoided, which type of tax policy would be more ideal? Conventional corporate theory based on microeconomic approaches does not yield a definitive answer, as either policy would distort firm investment and decrease firm value. Distinct from previous models, this paper addresses the double taxation issue in a macroeconomic context under a Laibson-type hyperbolic discounting model. In particular, this paper shows that in the hyperbolic economy, dividend taxes can improve consumer welfare, even though they decrease firm value. On the other hand, corporate income taxes negatively impact both consumers and firms. We also extend this result in an infinite-period steady-state model and show quantitative implications.

We document the importance of political promotion incentives for supervisors in banking supervision. Utilizing the merger of the China Banking Regulatory Commission (CBRC) and the China Insurance Regulatory Commission (CIRC) in 2018, we explore the actions of head of the CBRC's regional offices. We find that the increased political promotion incentives are associated with higher frequency, greater amount, and greater severity of penalties in regional banking supervision. The enhanced supervision is more remarkable when the head of the CBRC's regional offices has a higher political rank. After the merger of the two commissions, the regional banking supervision is significantly weakened with the disappearance of political promotion incentives. Furthermore, these enhanced regional supervision triggered by the merger event reduce bank risk. Our findings show that the increased political promotion incentives affect the supervisor's activities and improve the supervision effectiveness.

We investigate the relationship between internal governance and firms' innovation. We hypothesize that internal governance stemming from the difference in expected employment horizons between a CEO and her subordinate executives improves a firm's innovation. Using the age difference between a CEO and her subordinate executives as the primary measure of internal governance, we find a strong positive relationship between internal governance and firms' innovation output, and scientific and economic values. We show that the positive relation is causal and robust based on empirical tests including exogenous variation in internal governance resulting from non-forced CEO turnovers. We further show that the relationship between internal governance and innovation is more pronounced when external governance is weaker and when subordinate executives are expected to have more influence on the board. Cross-sectional analysis shows that internal governance spurs innovation in younger firms, firms led by generalist CEOs, and when the likelihood of insider successions is higher.