This paper reexamines the beta-return relation through the lens of time-varying risk aversion. We show that the security market line (SML) depends critically on the level of aggregate risk aversion. During periods of high risk aversion, the SML exhibits a positive slope and an intercept that is statistically indistinguishable from zero, with investor sentiment playing only a minor role. During periods of low risk aversion, the SML slope becomes negative and the intercept is significantly positive. Investor sentiment affects the SML only when risk aversion is low. These patterns are robust across alternative portfolio constructions, longer investment horizons, and multiple measures of risk aversion.

The choice of payment methods in M&A deals can affect bidder stock and bond value through two channels simultaneously: signaling and wealth transfer. We propose a method to disentangle these two effects by combining observed bidder stock and bond abnormal returns around deal announcements. Our findings indicate that the negative average bidder stock return in stock deals is mostly caused by signaling, and the negative average bidder bond return in cash deals is mostly due to wealth transfer. We also hypothesize that signaling is related to bidder information uncertainty, while wealth transfer is related to deal significance and bidder default risk. Cross-sectional analysis supports our conjecture.

Mutual monitoring in a well-structured authority system can mitigate the agency problem. I empirically examine whether the number two executive in a firm, if given authority, incentive, and channels for communication and influence, is able to monitor and constrain the potentially self-interested CEO. I find strong evidence that: (1) measures of the presence and extent of mutual monitoring from the No. 2 executive are positively related to future firm value (Tobin’s Q); (2) the beneficial effect is more pronounced for firms with stronger incentives for the No. 2 to monitor and with higher information asymmetry between the boards and the CEOs; and (3) mutual monitoring is a substitute for other governance mechanisms. The results suggest that mutual monitoring provides important checks and balances on CEO power.

This paper does three things. First, it explores the type of asymmetry in exchange rate correlation for five inflation-targeting countries. We show their currencies co-move more closely with the currencies of some influential foreign countries during joint appreciations than joint depreciations against a world currency. Second, it establishes empirically the linkage between interest rate differentials and exchange rate correlation. We find evidence that both widening and narrowing interest rate differentials will reduce the correlation. Third, it proposes a new version of the asymmetric dynamic conditional correlation model. The model proves to be capable of providing great insight into the two issues investigated.

Based on the hand-collected board structure data of 277 listed banks across 55 countries, and the bank regulation and supervision database compiled by the World Bank, this paper provides the first cross-country assessment of the impacts of bank regulations on board independence of banks. In line with Beck et al. (2006), we examine the effects of two types of regulation policies, the first involving the empowerment of supervisory agencies to monitor and discipline banks directly, and the second focusing on encouraging private monitoring of banks through requiring disclosure of more accurate and complete information. We find that empowering official supervisory agencies to discipline banks directly reduces board independence, but encouraging private sector monitoring of banks increases it. The findings suggest that the first type of regulations tends to crowd out the internal governance of banks, while the second crowds in it. We also find that the legal system with better investor rights protection and better contracts enforcement not only increases board independence but also enhances the crowding in effect of promoting private monitoring and decreases the crowding out effect of direct official supervision on board independence.

This paper assesses the sensitivity of the risk buffers, or capital requirements, of central counterparties clearing over-the-counter derivatives trades to a range of model inputs. It finds capital requirements to be highly sensitive to whether key model parameters are calibrated on a point-in-time versus stress-period basis, whether the risk tolerance metric adequately captures tail-risk events, and the ability – or lack thereof – to define exposures on the basis of netting sets spanning multiple risk factors. Our results suggest that there are considerable benefits from prudential authorities adopting a more prescriptive approach to central counterparties’ risk buffers, in line with recent enhancement of the capital regime for banks’ trading books.

We investigate stock tail risk around national elections worldwide over the period of 1982–2012. We find that firm stock is less likely to crash during the election years, and is more likely to crash during the post-election period. This inter-temporal pattern is consistent with the suppression of negative information when there is heightened political uncertainty around elections and with the subsequent release of adverse news when the uncertainty is reduced. Further analysis shows that the impact of political uncertainty on tail risk is stronger in countries with poorer investor protection, fewer electoral checks and balances, more uncertain election outcomes and pro-business incumbent governments, in industries which are more politically sensitive, and in firms with larger information asymmetry.

We examine the impact of the global trend towards trade protectionism on household stock market participation, focusing on the 2018–19 US-China trade war as an exogenous trade shock. We leverage cross-city variation in exposure to the trade war by combining industry-specific increases in US tariffs with variation in industry composition across cities. Using nationally representative household finance survey data collected around the trade war years, and a difference-in-differences design, results show that the onset of the trade war decreases the likelihood of households participating in the stock market and reduces the proportion of stocks in their portfolios. Further evidence reveals that these effects stem from the trade war's influence on decreasing household income, increasing income volatility, fostering risk aversion, and promoting negative views or beliefs about the economy. Our findings suggest that reduced stock market participation is a pathway through which trade protectionism affects the financial system and the economy.

This study investigates whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) mitigates or contributes to stock price crash risk. Crash risk, defined as the conditional skewness of return distribution, captures asymmetry in risk and is important for investment decisions and risk management. If socially responsible firms commit to a high standard of transparency and engage in less bad news hoarding, they would have lower crash risk. However, if managers engage in CSR to cover up bad news and divert shareholder scrutiny, CSR would be associated with higher crash risk. Our findings support the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk. We find that firms’ CSR performance is negatively associated with future crash risk after controlling for other predictors of crash risk. The result holds after we account for potential endogeneity. Moreover, the mitigating effect of CSR on crash risk is more pronounced when firms have less effective corporate governance or a lower level of institutional ownership. The results are consistent with the notion that firms that actively engage in CSR also refrain from bad news hoarding behavior, thus reducing crash risk. This role of CSR is particularly important when governance mechanisms, such as monitoring by boards or institutional investors, are weak.