We show that a bank's knowledge of an industry developed through its loan portfolio facilitates the bank's credit provision to other firms in that industry. This effect works beyond the bank's private information about the focal firm and is consistent with a cross information production where experience with other firms from a similar background reduces information asymmetry on the firm concerned. To tackle endogeneity, we develop an instrument for a bank's expertise in an industry based on historical, natural, and regulatory conditions. We provide further evidence using the 2007 housing market crash as a laboratory. We find that banks hit by the shock rebalance loan allocations to buffer borrowers in their expertise industries from a credit crunch. The effect of industry expertise is more pronounced for opaque firms and firms facing foreign competition pressure. Our findings suggest a spillover effect or economies of scale in banks’ information production. It helps explain the cost efficiency of financial intermediaries relative to direct lending and why, beyond relationship considerations, firms may prefer some banks over others.

This paper provides new evidence on the impact of the housing collateral lending channel on entrepreneurial activities by allowing homeowners to access property equity and invest in new businesses. We exploit dual housing property rights forms in China as an instrument, where complete access to collateral values is only legally granted to homeowners with full property rights (FPR), with no access for those without FPR. Using data from a large survey, we find that local house price growth significantly increases the probability of starting a new business for FPR homeowners relative to the control group. The effects are robust when we rely on the exogenous shock induced by the house purchase restriction and primarily driven by homeowners without household debt. Macro analysis supports a positive correlation between the concentration of FPR homeowners and employment and economic growth, where homeowners are better able to obtain external financing via the collateral channel.

We study whether and how banks reuse information across different but related borrowers in financing mergers and acquisitions. We find that stronger prior lending relationships between acquisition loan lenders and acquisition targets are associated with lower spreads and fewer covenant restrictions on acquisition loans. We show that the results are unlikely to be driven by unobservable acquirer, target, or lender characteristics. Consistent with the information asymmetry hypothesis, the effect is stronger when information asymmetry about the target firm is higher. We also find that the result is not driven by the coinsurance effect.

We model the impact of supply and demand on risk premiums in electricity futures, using daily data for 2003–2014. The model provides a satisfactory fit and allows for unspanned economic risk not embedded in futures prices. Model-implied spot risk premiums and forward biases are large, negative, highly time-varying, and exhibit plausible seasonal patterns. They differ from existing models, especially in periods of market turmoil, have not decreased in size over time, and help predict future returns. Both demand and supply have an economically significant impact on risk premiums. The risk premium associated with supply is characterized by large positive outliers.

Using a sample of Chinese households, we study how a type of social capital, private social networks, affects access to credit and its implications for consumption. We find a strong and likely causal link between private social networks, use of informal credit, and household consumption. Informal credit via private social networks facilitates household consumption especially for households that experienced a recent health shock, that face financial constraints, and that do not have access to formal finance, and the effects are more pronounced in poor regions and rural areas.

Directors’ and officers’ liability insurance (D&O insurance) is one of the most controversial and least understood governance tools. Using manually collected voting data for all director types at Chinese listed firms, we provide the first evidence for the impact of D&O insurance on directors’ voting decisions and the subsequent effects on corporate governance and financial performance. We find that independent directors at firms carrying D&O insurance are more likely to dissent when benchmarked against their peers in the same firm on the same proposal. Our results are robust to endogeneity checks. We identify channels through which the incentive effects of D&O insurance operate. We also find that the positive effect of D&O insurance on independent director dissension is associated with better firm performance and monitoring outcomes, including less litigation and lower claim values, less underinvestment, better internal control quality, and improved CEO pay- and turnover-performance sensitivities.

We introduce a novel weighted least squares approach to estimate daily realized covariation and microstructure noise variance using high-frequency data. We provide an asymptotic theory and conduct a comprehensive Monte Carlo simulation to demonstrate the desirable statistical properties of the new estimator, compared with existing estimators in the literature. Using high-frequency data of 27 DJIA constituting stocks over a period from 2014 to 2020, we confirm that the new estimator performs well in comparison with existing estimators. We also show that the noise variance extracted based on our method can be used to improve volatility forecasting and asset allocation performance.