We assess the potential impact for non-high-income countries (NHICs) of linking bank capital asset requirements (CARs) to private sector ratings–as contemplated by the new Basel proposal. Specifically, we show that linking bank CARs to external ratings would have a series of undesirable effects for NHICs. First, since ratings are by far less widespread for banks and corporations in NHICs, bank CARs would be practically insensitive to improvements in the quality of assets, widening the gap between banks of equal financial strength located in higher and lower income countries. Second, bank and corporate ratings in NHICs (as opposed to their homologues in high-income countries) are strongly linked to their sovereign ratings. This would expose bank capital requirements in NHICs to the same “pro-cyclical” swings, which have characterized sovereign rating revision in the recent crisis episodes. We conclude that linking bank CARs to private sector ratings would worsen the availability and cost of credit to NHICs – with potential negative effects on the level of economic activity – and suggest that a reassessment of the Basel proposal may help to avoid such undesired consequences.

Marshalling a large and novel dataset of cell towers and using the purchase of Yu’E Bao as a proxy for Chinese households’ investment in money market funds, this paper investigates how broadband infrastructure affects the welfare of households in wealth management. We find that with the improvement in broadband infrastructure, Internet service becomes more available to households and they tend to convert bank deposits with suppressed rates of interest into money market funds that provide less regulated and hence higher rates of return. Further analyses show that the effect of broadband infrastructure on the conversion of bank deposits into money market funds is more pronounced in counties with lower density of bank branches and among less educated people. Our empirical findings suggest that by alleviating the policy distortions imposed on the traditional banking sector, online financial products and service are powerful tools in the promotion of financial inclusion.

Recent reform in China has made a subset of Chinese stocks available to foreign investors, partially opening up China's stock market. Our difference-in-differences analysis shows that this liberalization reform boosts investments in investable firms relative to noninvestable ones, with results robust to various sensitivity analyses. Besides capital inflows and risk sharing, a potential but underexplored channel is improved corporate governance due to direct and indirect pressures from foreign investors, which lowers the cost of capital and improves capital allocation efficiency. Consistent with this corporate governance channel, we find that the liberalization reform reduces investable firms’ agency costs, increases their investment efficiency and total factor productivity, and improves their operating performance. Further analysis finds that the positive investment effect from the liberalization reform is stronger among firms that were poorly governed before the reform.

We show that increases in oil prices, rather than changes in oil prices, can predict stock returns. The revealed stock return predictability is both statistically and economically significant. The forecasting performance of oil price increases is not affected by changes in the choice of subsample, a considerable advantage over other popular predictors. We obtain greater forecasting gains by adding oil price increases as an additional predictor to univariate macro models. This forecasting improvement is also present when using multivariate information methods. The success of oil-macro models in forecasting stock returns is robust to a large battery of robustness tests. Oil price increases predict stock returns by affecting future industrial production and discount rates.

This study investigates the impact of heightened investor attention on stock price manipulation. To establish causality, we employ daily repeated quasi-natural experiments, where investors’ attention is influenced exogenously by price rounding rather than by stocks’ fundamental information. Our findings demonstrate that stocks included in the Winner List attract significant investor attention, which leads to increased stock price manipulation. A two-stage channel analysis reveals that this increased investor attention exacerbates stock price manipulation through noise trading. Moreover, the positive relationship between investor attention and stock price manipulation is more pronounced in stocks with higher firm-specific information asymmetry, fewer rational investors, weaker external monitoring, higher costs of arbitrage, and non-shortability. Additional analyses indicate that this positive relationship intensifies during periods of heightened investor sentiment, greater economic policy uncertainty and increased geopolitical risk. Our study provides original evidence that the saliency of information exacerbates stock price manipulation and destabilizes financial markets.

During the 2015 stock market crisis, the Chinese government used hundreds of billions of dollars to purchase shares directly in the secondary market. We find that compared with non-rescued firms, rescued firms have significantly lower liquidity after being rescued. Policy uncertainty regarding subsequent interventions better explains the reduction in liquidity than the liquidity dry-up and bad firm signaling hypotheses. Inconsistent with the potential moral hazards associated with government bailouts, the investment policies of rescued firms become more conservative after being rescued. Our evidence warns of the unintended consequences of direct purchase rescue programs.