Das et al. (2010) develop a model where an investor divides his or her wealth among mental accounts with motives such as retirement and bequest. Nevertheless, the investor ends up selecting portfolios within mental accounts and an aggregate portfolio that lie on the mean–variance frontier. Importantly, they assume that the investor only faces portfolio risk. In practice, however, many individuals also face background risk. Accordingly, our paper expands upon theirs by considering the case where the investor faces background risk. Our contribution is threefold. First, we provide an analytical characterization of the existence and composition of the optimal portfolios within accounts and the aggregate portfolio. Second, we show that these portfolios lie away from the mean–variance frontier under fairly general conditions. Third, we find that the composition and location of such portfolios can differ notably from those of portfolios on the mean–variance frontier.

This paper addresses the effects of bank competition on the risk-taking behaviors of banks in 10 Latin American countries between 2003 and 2008. We conduct our empirical approach in two steps. First, we estimate the Boone indicator, which is a measure of competition. We then regress this measure and other explanatory variables on the banking “stability inefficiency” derived simultaneously from the estimation of a stability stochastic frontier. Unlike previous findings, this paper concludes that competition affects risk-taking behavior in a non-linear way as both high and low competition levels enhance financial stability, while we find the opposite effect for average competition. In addition, bank size and capitalization are essential factors in explaining this relationship. On the one hand, the larger a bank is, the more it benefits from competition. On the other hand, a greater capital ratio is advantageous for banks that operate in collusive markets, while capitalization only enhances the stability of larger banks under high and average competition. These results are of extreme importance when considering bank regulations, especially in light of the recent turmoil in the global financial markets.

We study the effects of imposing repeated short-horizon regulatory constraints on long-term investors. We show that Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall constraints, when imposed dynamically, lead to similar optimal portfolios and wealth distributions. We also show that, in utility terms, the costs of imposing these constraints can be sizeable. For a 96% funded pension plan, both an annual Value-at-Risk constraint and an annual Expected Shortfall constraint can lead to an economic cost of about 2.5–3.8% of initial wealth over a 15-year horizon.

This paper has three objectives. First, using a richer and more comprehensive set of IMF-related news than previous studies, we examine the impact of IMF-related news on both financial and real stock sector returns in Indonesia during the Asian crisis. Second, we draw lessons about financial and real sectoral patterns of adjustment in crisis countries, including whether and how IMF programs facilitate this adjustment. Third, we explore the interplay between IMF actions in crisis countries and the actions and responses of local authorities. To do so, not only do we account for the impact of news regarding IMF policy actions but also the government’s reaction to them and willingness to implement such policies, and the public sentiment about the implemented IMF programs and government policies. We discuss the policy implications of the findings.

On May 29, 2008 the Wall Street Journal published an article alleging that several global banks were reporting Libor quotes significantly lower than those implied by prevailing credit default swap (CDS) spreads. While acknowledging that the “analysis doesn’t prove that banks are lying or manipulating Libor,” it nevertheless conjectures that these banks may “have been low-balling their borrowing rates to avoid looking desperate for cash.” In this paper we compare Libor with other short-term borrowing rates, analyze individual bank quotes, and compare these individual quotes to CDS spreads and market capitalization data during three periods: 1/1/07–8/8/07 (Period 1), 8/9/07–4/16/08 (Period 2), and 4/17/08–5/30/08 (Period 3). We find some anomalous individual quotes, but the evidence is inconsistent with a material manipulation of the US dollar 1-month Libor rate.

Christophe et al. (2010) find evidence of abnormal short activity prior to analyst downgrades and argue that short sellers may be violating SEC insider-trading laws by trading on information obtained from analysts about upcoming downgrades. However, observing abnormal shorting prior to downgrades is not tantamount to determining that short sellers are trading on tips from analysts unless shorting is abnormally low prior to upgrades. This paper revisits this issue. While we observe abnormal shorting prior to downgrades, we also find markedly higher shorting prior to upgrades. In fact, the short-selling patterns surrounding both downgrades and upgrades are remarkably symmetric indicating that short sellers during the pre-recommendation period are not unusually informed about the direction of upcoming recommendation changes. If anything, our findings indicate that short selling prior to analyst recommendations is more likely speculative than informed.

We study fiscal behaviour and the sovereign yield curve in the US and Germany. We obtain the latent factors, level, slope and curvature, with the Kalman filter, and use them in a VAR with macro, fiscal and financial stress variables. In the US, fiscal shocks generate an immediate response of the short-end of the yield curve, associated with monetary policy, lasting 6–8 quarters, followed by a response of the whole yield curve lasting 3years, with an implied elasticity of long-term yields of 80% for the government debt shock and 48% for the budget balance shock. In Germany, fiscal shocks have entailed no significant reactions of the yield curve shape and no response of the monetary policy interest rate, notably after 1999; only in the case of debt shocks there is a short-lived decrease in the medium-end of the yield curve in the following 2nd and 3rd quarters.

We explore the relation between family ownership and corporate investment policy. Our analysis centers on two incentives, risk aversion and extended investment horizons, which potentially influence the level and type of investments that family firms undertake. We find that family firms devote less capital to long-term investments than firms with diffuse ownership structures. When dividing long-term investment into its two components of R&D and capital expenditures, we note that family firms, relative to nonfamily firms, prefer investing in physical assets relative to riskier R&D projects. Additional tests indicate that family firms receive fewer patent citations per dollar of R&D investment relative to nonfamily firms. Overall, all empirical results indicate that family preferences for lower firm risk, across all family sub-types, affects corporate R&D spending and capital expenditures.

The ongoing global financial crisis has led to the largest increase in state intervention since the Great Depression. Direct government ownership in publicly-traded corporations has increased dramatically since 2008. How will this increase in public ownership affect the governance of these erstwhile private companies? We examine the impact of government ownership on corporate governance using a sample of firms from the European Union, a region that is relatively familiar with active government participation. Our main finding is that government ownership is associated with lower governance quality. We further show that while government intervention is negatively related to governance quality in civil law countries, it is positively related to governance quality in common law countries. Finally, we find that the preferential voting rights of golden shares are especially damaging to governance quality.