This paper examines the bank productivity growth and integration process for the 28 EU countries during three main phases of the financial crisis: the U.S. subprime crisis (2007–2008), the global financial crisis (2009–2010) and the sovereign debt crisis (2010–2012). We extend the Malmquist Productivity Index by applying an additive two-stage DEA model. This allows us to explore the sources of growth in different stages of production. Furthermore, we assess the integration of European banks by analyzing the β-convergence and σ-convergence of the two-stage Productivity Index. Our results show a productivity growth during the U.S. subprime crisis, but a consistent decline during the global financial crisis. The loss of competitiveness of the European banking system is due to the drop in growth of the performance stage and technical change. Finally, we find a strong convergence pattern during the financial crisis, mainly driven by the catch up process of some Eastern countries and the drop in performance of Western countries.

Does a decrease in shareholder litigation enhance managers’ monitoring efforts by ensuring adequate firm risk management? We explore how state universal demand (UD) laws (which limit shareholder litigation as a mechanism to discipline managers), affect bank holding companies’ (BHCs) risk. Using a difference-in-differences analysis, we show that BHCs reduce their tail risk exposures after the implementation of UD laws, which is achieved by improving loan asset quality. Indeed, BHCs appear to apply stricter contract terms for syndicate loans to risky and opaque borrowers. We also show that UD law implementation leads to changes in BHC board composition by increasing the proportion of outside directors, the number of independent directors in audit committees and the number of independent directors with financial expertise.