I provide evidence of a new mechanism by which access to public securities mitigates the bank hold-up problem and reduces loan spreads – it increases a borrower's bargaining power vis-à-vis a lender by offering a bank loan substitute. Difference-in-differences results indicate that loan spreads decline following legislation that makes public securities more attractive, but only when public securities represent a credible substitute for the bank loan (i.e., for term loans taken out by credit rated borrowers). Spreads on revolving lines of credit, which are more complementary with public securities, increase.

Following the adoption of state laws that increase firing costs, there is an immediate and persistent 30% reduction in total mergers and acquisitions (M&A) dollar volume and average M&A size as well as an immediate increase in withdrawn deals. Firing costs do not affect M&A announcement returns, but there are negative returns surrounding the announcement of state laws that increase firing frictions, especially for future M&A targets. These findings suggest that post-merger employee turnover is a first-order source of value for U.S. mergers.