Using a newly constructed database for 26 countries over 2000-2014, we analyze cross-country and within-country differences in mortgage arrears. We find that restrictive macro-prudential policies, in particular lower regulatory loan-to-value ratios, are significantly associated with a lower share of mortgage arrears in total residential debt. Likewise, better institutions are related with lower delinquency rates, both directly and by enhancing the impact of macro-prudential policies and the right to recourse. We also find that the effect of macro-prudential policies is conditioned by several mortgage market characteristics, such as the maturity of loans, interest rate fixity, and tax deductibility of interest payments.

This paper experimentally studies the impact of bank and borrower fundamentals on loan repayment. We find that solvent borrowers are more likely to default strategically when the bank’s expected strength is low, although loan repayment is a Pareto dominant Nash equilibrium. Borrowers are also less likely to repay when other borrowers’ expected repayment capacity is low, regardless of banks’ fundamentals. We show that changes in expectations about bank and borrower fundamentals change the risk dominance properties of the borrowers’ coordination problem, and that these changes subsequently explain strategic defaults. For the individual borrower, loss aversion and negative past experiences reduce repayment, suggesting that bank failure can be contagious in times of distress.

We study the impact of disclosure about bank fundamentals on depositors’ behavior in the presence (and absence) of economic linkages between financial institutions. Using a controlled laboratory environment, we identify under which conditions disclosure is conducive to bank stability. We find that bank deposits are sensitive to perceived bank performance. While banks with strong fundamentals benefit from more precise disclosure, an opposite effect is present for solvent banks with weaker fundamentals. Depositors take information about economic linkages into account and correctly identify when disclosure about one institution conveys meaningful information for others. Our findings suggest potential costs of bank transparency and that disclosure may not always be stability-enhancing.