This paper examines how the similarity between the executive compensation leverage ratio and the firm leverage ratio affects the quality of the firm’s investment decisions. A larger leverage gap (i.e., a bigger difference between these two ratios) leads to more investment distortions. Managers with more debt-like compensation components tend to under-invest, whereas managers with larger equity-based compensation engage more in over-investment. Furthermore, investment distortion is likely to increase the equity (debt) value when compensation leverage is lower (higher) than firm leverage. These findings suggest that managers can deviate from an optimal investment policy to increase the value of their portfolio, and that a lower leverage gap can reduce agency costs.

Employing standard informed trading intuition, we develop testable hypotheses regarding short selling before and after bank enforcement action (EA) initiations. For U.S.-listed bank firm data for 2007 to 2012, we find strong support for differentiated short seller activity and skill in crisis versus non-crisis periods. In financial crises, short sellers predominantly position prior to EAs. The EA initiations then act as information-homogenizing and profit-taking events reducing incentives to remain positioned. In contrast, EAs in non-crisis periods appear to serve as wake-up calls that attract additional short selling. Our findings offer potentially important insights for regulators considering short sellers’ reactions to EA announcements in general, during financial crises, and when not experiencing a broad financial crisis.