We evaluate the return performance of long-short, market-neutral and bear mutual funds using multi-factor models and a conditional CAPM that allows for time-varying risk. Differences in the bearish posture of these mutual funds result in different performance characteristics. Returns to long-short mutual funds vary with the market, returns to market-neutral mutual funds are uncorrelated with the market and returns to bear mutual funds are negatively correlated. Using the conditional CAPM we document significant changes in the market-risk exposure of the most bearish of these funds during different economic climates. We then assess the flow-performance relationship for up to 60months following up and down markets and find that investors direct flows towards market-neutral and bearish funds for several months after down markets. Market-neutral funds provide a down market hedge, but bear funds do not generate the returns that investors hope for.

Financial stability has proved elusive. Despite the success of central banks in controlling inflation, economies continue to experience periods of exchange rate overvaluation, stock market volatility and housing price bubbles that affect individuals very deeply. This note speculates that such financial volatility may be the product of three factors, (a) successful inflation targeting, (b) the existence of nonlinearities and differential economic dynamics, and (c) the recent evolution of key structural parameters in the economy. If so, then central banks might better focus on making financial systems more resilient than on trying to develop more sophisticated policies aimed at reducing financial volatility.

This paper argues that although financial consolidation creates some dangers because it is leading to larger institutions who might expose the US financial system to increased systemic risk, these dangers can be handled by vigilant supervision and a government safety net with an appropriate amount of constructive ambiguity. Financial consolidation also opens up opportunities to dramatically reduce the scope of deposit insurance and limit it to narrow bank accounts, thus substantially reducing the moral hazard created by the government safety net. Reducing the scope of deposit insurance, however, does not eliminate the need for a government safety net, and thus there is still a strong need for adequate prudential supervision of the financial system. Moving to a world in which we have larger, nationwide, diversified financial institutions and in which deposit insurance plays a very limited role, should improve the efficiency of the financial system. However, it is no panacea: the job of financial regulators and supervisors will continue to be highly challenging in the future.