For market discipline to be effective, market factors such as changes in firm equity and debt values and returns, must influence firm decision making. In banking, this can occur directly via bank management or indirectly though supervisory examinations and oversight influencing bank management. In this study, we investigate whether equity market variables can provide timely information and add value to accounting models that predict changes in bank holding company (BOPEC) risk ratings over the 1988–2000 period. Using a variety of equity market indicators, the findings suggest that one-quarter lagged market data adds forecast value to lagged financial statement data and prior supervisory information in the logistic regressions. Furthermore, using extensive out-of-sample testing for the years 2001–2003, we find: (1) that multiple models estimated over different phases of the business and banking cycles are superior to a single model for forecasting BOPEC rating changes; (2) that equity data adds economically significant power in forecasting BOPEC rating upgrades and performs well for identifying no changes; (3) that for downgrades, the accounting model forecasts the best; (4) that modeling the three possible risk ratings categories simultaneously (downgrade, no change and upgrade) minimizes both Type I and Type II classification errors; and (5) that using multiple models to forecast risk ratings enhances the overall percentage of correct classifications.

This paper examines whether bank holding company (BHC) risk ratings are asymmetrically assigned or biased over business cycles from 1986 to 2003. In a model of ratings determination which accounts for bank characteristics, financial market conditions, past supervisory information, and aggregate macro-economic factors, we find that bank exam ratings exhibit inter-temporal characteristics. First, exam ratings exhibit some evidence of examiner bias for several periods analyzed. When the business cycle turns, examiners sometime depart from standards that they set during the previous phases of the cycle. However, this bias is not widespread or systematic. Second, exam ratings exhibit some inertia. Our results suggest that examiners rate on the side of not changing (rather than upgrading or downgrading) an institution’s exam rating. Third, we find robust evidence of a secular trend towards more stringent examination BHC ratings standards over time.

This paper empirically analyzes the relation between foreign bank ownership and the three pillars of the New Basel Capital Accord (i.e., capital regulatory oversight, supervisory oversight, and market discipline). Using a new database covering 153 countries, we find that countries with greater market discipline have a lower presence of foreign banks operating in their economy. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that capital regulatory oversight and supervisory oversight are not significantly related to foreign bank ownership.

We show how a high degree of commonality in investor liquidity shocks can diminish incentives for intermediaries to keep markets open and lead to market collapse, even without information asymmetry or news affecting fundamentals. We motivate our model using the perpetual floating-rate note market where two years of explosive growth – in which issues by high quality borrowers were placed with institutional investors and traded in a liquid secondary market – were followed by a precipitous collapse when market intermediaries withdrew due to large order imbalances. We shed new light on the trade-off between ownership concentration and market liquidity.

This paper investigates the liquidity effect in asset pricing by studying the liquidity–premium relationship of an American depositary receipt (ADR) and its underlying share. Using the [Amihud, Yakov, 2002. Illiquidity and stock returns: cross-section and time series effects. Journal of Financial Markets 5, 31–56] measure, the turnover ratio and trading infrequency as proxies for liquidity, we show that a higher ADR premium is associated with higher ADR liquidity and lower home share liquidity, in terms of changes in these variables. We find that the liquidity effects remain strong after we control for firm size and a number of country characteristics, such as the expected change in the foreign exchange rate, the stock market performance, as well as several variables measuring the openness and transparency of the home market.

Knowledge of the statistical distribution of the prices of emission allowances, and their forecastability, are crucial in constructing, among other things, purchasing and risk management strategies in the emissions-constrained markets. This paper analyzes the two emission permits markets, CO2 in Europe, and SO2 in the US, and investigates a model for dealing with the unique stylized facts of this type of data. Its effectiveness in terms of model fit and out-of-sample value-at-risk-forecasting, as compared to models commonly used in risk-forecasting contexts, is demonstrated.

In this paper, we demonstrate the need for a negative market price of volatility risk to recover the difference between Black–Scholes [Black, F., Scholes, M., 1973. The pricing of options and corporate liabilities. Journal of Political Economy 81, 637–654]/Black [Black, F., 1976. Studies of stock price volatility changes. In: Proceedings of the 1976 Meetings of the Business and Economics Statistics Section, American Statistical Association, pp. 177–181] implied volatility and realized-term volatility. Initially, using quasi-Monte Carlo simulation, we demonstrate numerically that a negative market price of volatility risk is the key risk premium in explaining the disparity between risk-neutral and statistical volatility in both equity and commodity-energy markets. This is robust to multiple specifications that also incorporate jumps. Next, using futures and options data from natural gas, heating oil and crude oil contracts over a 10year period, we estimate the volatility risk premium and demonstrate that the premium is negative and significant for all three commodities. Additionally, there appear distinct seasonality patterns for natural gas and heating oil, where winter/withdrawal months have higher volatility risk premiums. Computing such a negative market price of volatility risk highlights the importance of volatility risk in understanding priced volatility in these financial markets.

This study forwards an explanation and empirical investigation of price clustering in retail banking markets. It is proposed that price or interest rate clustering forms in retail markets as firms wish to maximise returns from customers, some of whom have difficulties in recalling and processing price information. This theory is developed and tested using a dataset of retail interest rates from the UK which enables interest rate clustering to be viewed in both lending and investment markets, and at different levels of financial involvement. It is found that interest rate clustering occurs in a manner consistent with firms maximising returns from customers. These findings are viewed to be a key policy concern for financial regulators and firms concerned with consumer protection.

This paper considers the Samuelson hypothesis, which argues that the futures price volatility increases as the futures contract approaches its expiration. Utilizing intraday data from 20 futures markets in six futures exchanges, we find strong support for the Samuelson hypothesis in agricultural futures. However, the Samuelson hypothesis does not hold for other futures contracts. We also provide supporting evidence that the ‘negative covariance’ hypothesis is the key factor for the empirical support of the Samuelson hypothesis. In addition, our findings remain largely unaltered even after we control for seasonality and liquidity effects.

For US credit unions, revenue from non-interest sources has increased significantly in recent years. We investigate the impact of revenue diversification on financial performance for the period 1993–2004. The impact of a change in strategy that alters the share of non-interest income is decomposed into a direct exposure effect, reflecting the difference between interest and non-interest bearing activities, and an indirect exposure effect which reflects the effect of the institution’s own degree of diversification. On both risk-adjusted and unadjusted returns measures, a positive direct exposure effect is outweighed by a negative indirect exposure effect for all but the largest credit unions. This may imply that similar diversification strategies are not appropriate for large and small credit unions. Small credit unions should eschew diversification and continue to operate as simple savings and loan institutions, while large credit unions should be encouraged to exploit new product opportunities around their core expertise.