We use the 2016 U.S. SEC tick size pilot to examine the effects of an increase in the minimum price variation on limit order book liquidity in NASDAQ-listed stocks on the NASDAQ exchange. For treatment stocks with an average pre-pilot quoted spread less than 0.05, the tick size increase is binding and leads to a significant decrease in liquidity in the limit order book. Specifically, the implied cost to trade at and away from the best bid and offer prices increases and the limit order book becomes less resilient – the amount of time required for a deviation in liquidity to return to its long-run mean. For treatment stocks with an average pre-pilot quoted spread of at least 0.05, the tick size increase is non-binding and leads to either a slight decrease, or no change in limit order book liquidity.

We investigate the link between stock and options markets during the 2008 U.S. short sale ban. First, we find definitive evidence that the ban indeed caused stock overvaluation. Second, we show that the short sale ban caused a significant increase in put-call parity violations only in the direction of the short sale constraints and it significantly enhanced the stock return predictability of put-call parity violations. Third, the overvaluation is really large. A portfolio formed on the trading signal that the put-call parity violation is in the top quintile underperforms the lowest quintile portfolio by a statistically and economically significant abnormal daily return of 5.6% during the short sale ban period. We employ a novel and rigorous method of using TAQ intraday data to ensure that our high-low violation arbitrage portfolio as well as the five Fama-French factors used to estimate the abnormal returns are implementable by a hypothetical investor exempt from the shorting ban.

We investigate how director networks impact IPO characteristics and find that firms with better-connected directors have higher IPO market valuation, more positive offer price revisions, higher first-day returns, more pre-IPO media coverage, and superior post-IPO stock performance. Director networks are beneficial to the share offering because corporate directors help facilitate information exchange with prospective investors, attract their attention to the IPO, and maintain and grow their interest after the IPO.

We examine how capital structure considerations affect acquisition pricing and valuation. We find that debt capacity improvement is value-enhancing for all acquirers when they gradually reveal their growth opportunities to the market. This is reflected in the long-run stock market returns, both 12- and 24-months after acquisition announcement. While both overlevered and underlevered acquirers benefit from an increase in debt capacity resulting from the merger, only overlevered acquirers pay higher premiums to increase debt capacity. Underlevered acquirers do not pay a premium for it; instead they consider market timing opportunities. Results are robust for alternative definitions of leverage and debt capacity improvement.

We analyze the price impact of an exogenous share sale of inside blockholders who were forced to sell a part of their shareholdings following a regulatory change in India. The affected firms experience a negative excess return of 4.3% during the issue week. Crucially, the price impact reverses within around 16 days of the event. Our results are consistent with the view that long-term demand curves for stocks are flat; this view is echoed in classical finance theories. The short-term price reaction to a sale is probably due to temporary price pressure.

Contains fulltext : 199743.pdf (Publisher’s version ) (Open Access)

Collectively organized pension plans must increasingly demonstrate that the risk preferences of their members are adequately reflected in the plans’ asset allocations. However, whether funds should elicit individual members’ risk preferences to achieve this goal, or whether they can rely on other indicators, such as socio-demographics, remains unclear. To address this question, we apply a tailored augmented lottery choice method to elicit individual pension income risk preferences from 7,894 members from five different pension plans. The results show that member risk preferences are strongly heterogeneous and can only partially be predicted from individual and plan characteristics. Differences in risk preference imply different optimal asset allocations. We find large welfare losses for heterogeneous members in pension plans with their current asset allocation because these allocations are safer than implied by members’ preferences. We provide a framework for pension plans to gauge the need to elicit risk preferences among their members.