Farre-Mensa, Michaely and Schmalz (2018) document that many firms issue new equity to finance their payouts to shareholders, despite the substantial cost of equity issuance. We find that equity-financed payouts are related to institutional investors’ horizon. Specifically, firms with a larger ownership by short-horizon institutions are more likely to have equity-financed discretionary payouts, and firms with equity-financed discretionary payouts tend to cut down their investments in the following years. Our results suggest that investor short-termism has significant effects on firms’ payout, financing and investment policies.

The relationship between corruption and acquisition performance is examined in this study, with a focus on stakeholder support. The findings indicate that total acquisition-related gains are reduced when firms with lower corruption pressures acquire targets with higher corruption pressures. Moreover, a negative relationship is highlighted between the corruption differential and the level of support provided by stakeholders. In addition, merger and acquisition deals with higher corruption differences receive lower average support from suppliers, customers, and employees. The evidence suggests that stakeholder commitment is a possible channel through which corruption affects corporate performance. Implementing anticorruption efforts and operating as a multinational corporation are two important factors that may reduce the impact of corruption on acquisition performance.