This study examines the association between informed short selling and a firm's position in the board interlock network formed by shared directors. We find that better-connected firms experience higher levels of informed short selling and that this association is driven by both eigenvector centrality (a measure that accounts for both the quantity and quality of firms’ ties) and betweenness centrality (a measure of the extent to which firms serve as information intermediaries), not by degree centrality (a measure that only counts the quantity of their ties) in interlock networks. In addition, the positive association between interlock centrality and informed trading is more pronounced for firms whose directors have more opportunities to interact with directors of external firms in the network, consistent with director information leakage serving as a plausible underlying channel. Our further tests do not support an alternative interpretation based on short sellers’ superior processing of public information. Our findings have policy implications for regulators and professional director associations.

We explore the effect of corporate opacity on the relation between staggered boards and firm value. We find that through mitigating takeover pressure, staggered boards become increasingly beneficial to firm value as opacity increases. In addition, we document that staggered boards reduce value only in transparent firms. Additional tests indicate that, as opacity increases, staggered boards bear an increasingly positive relation to research and development and CEO pay-performance sensitivity. Taken together, these results suggest that corporate opacity affects the value impact of takeover protection.

We examine the impact of analyst coverage on corporate tax aggressiveness. To address endogeneity concerns, we perform a difference-in-differences analysis using a setting which causes exogenous decreases in analyst coverage. Our tests identify a negative causal effect of analyst coverage on tax aggressiveness, suggesting that higher analyst coverage constrains corporate tax aggressiveness. Further cross-sectional variation tests find that this constraining effect on tax aggressiveness is more pronounced in firms with lower investor recognition and firms with more opaque information environments. Our results are consistent with the notion that higher analyst coverage increases the visibility of aggressive tax planning behavior as well as heightens analysts’ demand for more transparent information, which in turn reduces tax aggressiveness.