This paper links existence of the pyramidal ownership structure to tunneling and propping. Tunneling refers to a transfer of resources from a lower-level firm to a higher-level firm in the pyramidal chain, whereas propping concerns a transfer in the opposite direction intended to bail out the receiving firm from bankruptcy. We show that tunneling alone cannot justify the pyramidal structure unless outside investors are myopic, since rational outside investors anticipate tunneling and adjust their willingness-to-pay for the firm’s shares accordingly. With propping, however, they may be willing to be expropriated in exchange for implicit insurance against bankruptcy.

This paper focuses on the strategic role of corporate venture financing carried out by a corporation (a headquarter). When the headquarter finances a venture through its corporate venture-financing arm, it can increase the complementarity between products of the venture and the headquarter. The effect of having an increase in complementarity is a softening of ex post product market competition with rival products. Hence, in deciding whether to finance the venture, the headquarter faces a trade-off between, on the one hand, being more aggressive ex post in the product market, and, on the other hand, using venture financing to soften ex post competition with substitute products.