Knowledge that Transforms

When both independent and interdependent self‐concepts are available, priming either self‐concept will increase the accessibility in memory of the motivations and cognitions associated with it. Thus, priming the interdependent self may activate motivation to maintain harmony and conform to others’ opinions, whereas priming the independent self is likely to activate motivation to be independent and to withstand social pressure. Two experiments investigated implications of these possibilities for judgments of risk when participants anticipated (or not) explaining their judgments to others. Participants relied on others’ beliefs only when their interdependent self was primed and they expected they might have to explain their judgments to others. When their independent self was primed, expectations to communicate theirjudgments had no effect. Culture‐based differences in individualism vs. collectivism had no impact on these effects.

Construal level theory (Trope & Liberman, 2003) suggests that construal level––or the degree of abstractness of mental representations––increases with temporal, spatial, or sensory distance. Three experiments show that the mere presence of a set of target brands at the time a choice is made encourages consumers to represent the brands in memory in terms of concrete lower‐level construals. Consequently, preference stability is higher, preference‐behavior consistency is greater, and product category‐identification latencies for competing brands are slower. Furthermore, the mere presence of target brands at the time of choice affects preference‐behavior consistency independent of the effects of direct experience. Implications for an understanding of spontaneous preference formation, preference representation, and preference elicitation are discussed.

In this commentary, I focus on the deficiencies in the reflective‐impulsive model (RIM) by Strack, Werth, and Deutsch (2006) in terms of understanding the mechanics of the reflective system. Strack et al. outlined the cognitive architecture of the consumer with the RIM but failed to specify how its most impressive feature, the reflective system, is powered. Drawing on the literature on self‐regulation (as a reconceptualization of RIM incompatibility), I argue that self‐regulatory resources drive the reflective system. Research from 5 domains—overeating among dieters, impulsive spending, logical thinking, making choices, and subjective perceptions of duration—supports this hypothesis.

Based on theories of attribution and suspicion, three experiments highlight the mediating role of perceived sincerity of motives in determining the effectiveness of CSR activities. CSR activities improve a company's image when consumers attribute sincere motives, are ineffective when sincerity of motives is ambiguous, and hurt the company's image when motives are perceived as insincere. Variables affecting perceived sincerity include the benefit salience of the cause, the source through which consumers learn about CSR, and the ratio of CSR contributions and CSR‐related advertising. High benefit salience of the cause hurts the company, in particular when consumers learn about it from a company source. This backfire effect can be overcome by spending more on CSR activities than on advertising that features CSR.

Mental accounts are often characterized as self‐control devices that consumers employ to prevent excess spending and consumption. However, under certain conditions of ambiguity, the mental accounting process is malleable; that is, consumers have flexibility in assigning expenses to different mental accounts. We demonstrate how consumers flexibly classify expenses, or construct accounts, to justify spending. An expense that can be assigned to more than one account (i.e., an ambiguous expense) is more likely to be incurred than an unambiguous expense that is constrained either by existing budgets or by previously constructed accounts. We explore the justification processes that underlie these results and their implications for mental accounts as self‐control devices.