Knowledge that Transforms

This research examines how a focus on time versus money can lead to two distinct mind-sets that affect consumers' willingness to donate to charitable causes. The results of three experiments, conducted both in the lab and in the field, reveal that asking individuals to think about “how much time they would like to donate” (vs. “how much money they would like to donate”) to a charity increases the amount that they ultimately donate to the charity. Fueling this effect are differential mind-sets activated by time versus money. Implications for the research on time, money, and emotional well-being are discussed.

Prior research has shown that individuals are often susceptible to a false consensus effect, whereby they overestimate the extent to which others share their opinions. In three studies, we show that the strength of the false consensus effect is moderated by the valence of one's own opinion, such that overestimation of population consensus is greater when an individual likes an alternative as compared to when she or he dislikes it. Further, we show that this moderation of false consensus is driven by the availability of countervalence attributes, that is, disliked attributes in liked alternatives and liked attributes in disliked alternatives. We discuss theoretical and practical implications of these results.

Research indicates that mood can influence evaluation of a product when considered in isolation. However, little is known about its influence on comparisons among several alternatives. Four experiments assessed the nature of this influence. When evaluating each option individually upon encountering it, happy participants reported greater preferences for the first encountered option than unhappy participants. When withholding evaluations until having seen all options, however, happy participants reported greater preferences for the last encountered option than unhappy participants. Which comparison strategy was employed, and consequently the impact of mood on preferences, depended on the similarity of choice alternatives in terms of appearance versus descriptive features.

This research examines how identity-based interventions can improve consumer health. Results of laboratory and field experiments reveal that associating risky health behaviors with a social identity people do not want to signal can contaminate the behaviors and lead consumers to make healthier choices. College freshman reported consuming less alcohol (experiment 2), and restaurant patrons selected less fattening food (experiment 3), when drinking alcohol and eating junk food were presented as markers of avoidance groups. These findings demonstrate that identity-based interventions can shift the identities associated with real-world behaviors, thereby improving the health of populations. (c) 2008 by JOURNAL OF CONSUMER RESEARCH, Inc..

We investigate the effects of babyfaceness on the trustworthiness and judgments of a company's chief executive officer in a public relations crisis. Experiment 1 demonstrates boundary conditions for the babyfaceness-honesty trait inference and its influence on company evaluations. Experiment 2 shows that trait inferences of honesty are drawn spontaneously but are corrected in the presence of situational evidence (a severe crisis) if cognitive resources are available. We demonstrate that these babyface-trait associations underlie evaluations by reversing the babyface effect on judgments in (a) experiment 3, where a priming task creates associations counter to the typical babyface–unintentional harm stereotype, and (b) experiment 4, which creates a situation where innocence is a liability.

This article explores the phenomenon of “hyperopia,” or an aversion to indulgence, as introduced by Kivetz and Keinan (2006) and Kivetz and Simonson (2002). We first develop a measure to capture hyperopia as an individual difference. Three empirical studies use this measure to demonstrate that hyperopia and high self-control are both conceptually and empirically distinct. Further, we show that altering the level at which an action or item is construed can make an indulgent goal or luxury product more appealing to the high hyperopia consumer by influencing its value in terms of an attractive long-term outcome.

This research examines the moderating role of consumer's attachment style in the impact of brand personality. Findings support our hypotheses regarding the manner in which brand personality and attachment style differences systematically influence brand outcomes, including brand attachment, purchase likelihood, and brand choice. Results show that anxiously attached individuals are more likely to be differentially influenced by brand personalities. Further, the results indicate that the level of avoidance predicts the types of brand personality that are most relevant to anxious individuals. Specifically, under conditions of high avoidance and high anxiety, individuals exhibit a preference for exciting brands; however, under conditions of low avoidance and high anxiety, individuals tend to prefer sincere brands. The differential preference for sincere (vs. exciting) brand personality emerges in public (vs. private) consumption settings and in settings where interpersonal relationship expectations are high, supporting a signaling role of brand personality in these contexts.

We propose that when predicting future behavior, consumers selectively (but unwittingly) test the hypothesis that they will behave ideally. This selective hypothesis testing perspective on unrealistic optimism suggests that estimates of future behavior should be similar to those made by individuals who assume that conditions will be ideal. Moreover, consumers who initially provide estimates assuming that conditions will be ideal should recognize that the world is not ideal and so should test a more realistic hypothesis. In line with these predictions, we find that ideal-world estimates (e.g., In an ideal world, how often will you exercise next week?) do not differ from standard estimates (e.g., How often will you exercise next week?). We also find that individuals who initially estimate their behavior in an ideal world subsequently make more realistic predictions.

In five experiments we found that deliberation reduces preference consistency. In experiments 1 and 2, participants who deliberated on their preferences were less consistent in their evaluations compared to those who did not deliberate. Experiment 3 demonstrated that this effect is due to the impediment of deliberation and not to the benefit of nondeliberation. We hypothesized that deliberation leads to the inconsistent weighting of information, especially when the information is complex. As such, we predicted and found in experiments 4 and 5 that the extent to which deliberation decreases preference consistency depends upon the complexity of the information.