We analyze the influence of firm and managerial characteristics on executive compensation. Consistent with theory, we find monitoring difficulties result in greater use of options while CEO and blockholder ownership result in less. Risky investment is positively related to options and negatively related to cash bonus and restricted stock, suggesting that firms use options to encourage managers to take risks. We find a negative (positive) relation between options and leverage (convertible debt) consistent with minimizing the agency costs of debt. Finally, we provide new evidence on managerial horizon and incentives, documenting a concave relation between cash bonus and CEO age.

We use director elections to analyze outsider shareholder perspectives of agency problems in family firms. Compared to nonfamily firms, outsider shareholders in family firms provide weaker support for director slates proposed by the firms’ nominating committees. Outside shareholder support decreases when families receive private benefits of control, when family members serve in leadership roles, or when family members serve on board monitoring committees. We do not find similar results for other actively engaged concentrated owners. Our results provide new insights into outsider shareholders’ satisfaction with family control in publicly held firms and their perceptions of the family-outsider agency conflicts.

Using a sample of over 99,000 firm year observations encompassing extgreater13,800 firms from 1978 to 2007, we analyze how changes in labor market conditions influence the disciplining effect of debt on employee productivity. We document that better (worse) outside employment opportunities weaken (strengthen) the disciplinary effect of debt on employee output. The influence of outside employment options on leverage-output relation is robust to various controls for endogeneity, including using instrumental variables, a quasi-natural experiment, both firm and industry-level analysis, alternative model specifications, and controls for employees' work conditions and changes in work efficiencies. Altogether, our findings highlight the importance of labor market conditions on the efficacy of corporate financial policies and our understanding of how these policies influence economic outcomes.