Nonfinancial firms that use interest rate swaps are compared with nonusers for the years 1991, 1993, and 1995. Swap use grew from 6% of all firms in 1991 to 8% in 1995. Nonfinancial firms use fixed rate payer swaps more often than floating rate payer swaps. Firms that use swaps are significantly larger and have a higher debt to equity ratio relative to nonusers. Fixed rate payers receive a ratings' upgrade significantly more often than floating rate payers and experience a significantly higher percentage increase in net sales in the year of swap initiation relative to floating rate payers and the industry average. Floating rate payers have a significantly higher S&P bond rating relative to the industry average. The test results lend support to the information asymmetry theory of swap usage [Titman, S., 1992. Interest rate swaps and corporate financing choices, Journal of Finance 47, pp. 1503–1516] and lend some support to the asset substitution portion of the agency cost theory of swap usage [Wall, L.D., 1989. Interest rate swaps in an agency theoretic model with uncertain interest rates. Journal of Banking and Finance 13, pp. 261–270].

A unique but mostly unexplored feature of banks in debt markets is that they can either self-issue or use third-party underwriters. We analyze the importance of information sharing concerns, the need for certification and the value of underwriter distribution networks in two debt underwriting frameworks: the bank choice of self-underwriting versus third-party underwriting, and whether the bond is underwritten by a reputable bank. Exploring some specific structural features of European bank bond deals, we find that information sharing concerns are significantly related to the probability of self-issuance. The results also show that the need for certification, previous underwriting experience, issuer relationships with reputable underwriters and underwriter distribution capacity are particularly relevant for bank bonds underwritten by reputable banks.

We find that banks with capital and liquidity constraints are more likely to use credit risk transfer (CRT) instruments, including the credit derivative and the secondary loan markets. Relationship lenders and lead syndicate lenders are more likely to hold loans on their balance-sheets regardless of borrowers' riskiness. Finally, we find a separating equilibrium in the CRT market: loans to ex-ante riskier borrowers are more likely to be sold and loans to safer borrowers are more likely to be hedged with CDS. We view credit derivatives and loan sales as joint choice variables in determining the hedging instrument to use.

This paper investigates trading patterns in target and acquirer firms prior to public announcement of M&A deals, a corporate event in which group based co-offence has been anecdotally documented. Our analysis differentiates whether such trading is primarily conducted by hedge funds with short-term investment horizons as opposed to other short horizon investors or hedge funds and institutional investors with long-term horizons, in both the equity and derivatives markets. Our results are consistent with exploitation of M&A deal related information prior to the deal's public announcement. In particular we find that the greater the likelihood of insider information leakage, the greater the short-term hedge fund holdings. We consider several alternative explanations, such as those related to the short-term hedge fund's skill in identifying profitable trades' ex-ante; our results seem inconsistent with such alternative explanations.