We examine whether the immigration status of entrepreneurs is a concern for creditors when extending trade credit. Utilizing the disclosure of overseas residence rights of controlling shareholders in China, we show that overseas residence rights negatively affect firms' ability to obtain trade credit. This negative association is attenuated if the overseas jurisdiction has an extradition treaty with China. Our results are robust to the introduction of the Hong Kong national security law as a source of exogenous variation in the boundary of domestic law. The decrease in trade credit provision is more pronounced in firms that are perceived as less trustworthy (i.e., with less social trust or higher expropriation risk). Our results offer new insights into how the reach of law across borders can affect firms' financing activities.

We examine the governance transfer effect of corporate blockholders in a sample of 892 block acquisitions across 42 countries from 1990 to 2008. Using earnings management as a proxy for corporate governance outcome, we find that target firms' earnings management is aligned with that of block acquirers after acquisitions, implying that blockholders transfer their own governance quality to investee firms. We further identify three economic mechanisms that underlie the governance transfer effect, namely, monitoring effectiveness, monitoring cost, and monitoring environment. Our findings provide new insights into the governance role of blockholders.