We investigate how risk-related agency conflicts affect valuable risky investments. Using an exogenous negative shock to shareholders' litigation rights from an unanticipated court ruling that exacerbates risk-related agency conflicts by shielding managers from shareholders' governance through litigation, we show that innovation inputs and quality decline significantly for treated firms. Small firms lacking counteracting governance mechanisms, such as institutional investors, suffer significantly, while large firms with high institutional investments emerge unscathed. Our results are consistent with theories that predict managerial incentives for ‘playing safe’ lead to value-destroying and risk-reducing actions, especially when counteracting incentive mechanisms are muted.

We investigate the impact of product market competition (PMC) on workplace health and safety violations. Our findings reveal that firms facing intense PMC have higher incidences of workplace safety standards violations and pay higher penalties for such offenses. By leveraging reductions in import tariffs as quasi-exogenous shocks, we demonstrate that competitive pressures significantly worsen these violations. The strategic orientations of firms, whether towards cost-cutting or product differentiation, markedly shape these outcomes. Furthermore, pressure from analysts amplifies the negative impact, while labor unionization helps mitigate these detrimental effects, highlighting the nuanced interplay between governance and market forces.