Knowledge that Transforms

China's recent promotion of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) has coincided with a marked increase in the number of Chinese listed firms attracting female board members and foreign equity investors. Using Rankins' (RKS) ratings over the 2009 to 2013 period, we show that greater gender balance in top-management supports stronger CSR performance. This finding broadens gender-based accounts emphasizing social networks (Westphal and Milton, 2000), Critical Mass Theory (Kramer et al., 2006; Bear et al., 2010; and Soares et al., 2011) and team dynamics (Woolley et al., 2010; and Hoogendoorn et al., 2013). Findings also reveal stronger CSR performance in firms where a female officer is present at the CEO and/or vice-CEO level. Female leadership thus appears to be just as important as gender mix in driving CSR change. Our findings shed new light and add further dimension to the nascent literature on gender and CSR-engagement in China (Lau et al., 2016; and Liao et al., 2016). We examine whether a political-networking motivation underlies foreign investment (Du and Girma, 2010; Liu et al., 2014a; Lin et al., 2015; and Jiang and Kim, 2015). We argue that qualified foreign institutional investors (QFIIs) deploy social-engagement in non-SOEs to build competitive advantage. But in SOEs, where strong political networks already exist, QFIIs have less incentive to boost CSR ratings. Results indicate little difference in the social ratings of QFII-invested SOEs and non-SOEs. However, CSR scores are increasing in foreign ownership levels in SOEs. By considering offshore ownership, we broaden understanding of how foreign channels influence CSR in China (Tsoi, 2010; Cheung et al., 2014a; and Lau et al., 2016). Additionally, we confirm the Barnea and Rubin (2010) contention of an inversion in social ratings at entrenched managerial ownership levels. Non-linear rating effects also emerge in relation to state ownership (Li et al., 2013). Finally, CSR performance exhibits positive (negative) relation with a listed entity's size and age (leverage and lagged return-on-equity) but virtually no connection with independent board representation.

We use data from a large survey of Chinese firms to investigate whether local government efforts to facilitate market development improve firm efficiency. Both government provision of information about products, markets, and innovation and government assistance in arranging loans are positively associated with firm efficiency, and those private firms with weak access to and knowledge of financial, input, and product markets benefit most from such assistance. These patterns are robust across multiple estimation approaches. Our examination of the determinants of local government facilitation also suggests that it gravitates toward promoting efficiency, though there are also indications that rent-seeking may play a role. Our evidence is consistent with the notion that government facilitation can help some firms overcome market failures in the early stages of a country's private sector development. Though causality is difficult to establish, we argue that changing fiscal dynamics that forced local governments to become increasingly self-reliant in generating revenue, and a government promotion system based on local economic performance, were key motivating factors for market facilitation by local government officials.

On October 11, 2011, a non-governmental organization called ActionAid published a report condemning the FTSE 100 firms for holding an unusually large number of subsidiaries in tax havens. Urging the government to implement appropriate actions, the report raised the firms' costs of holding tax haven subsidiaries. After this event, the stock prices of the nonfinancial firms experienced a 0.9% abnormal drop (corresponding to about £9billion in market capitalization). Those better-governed firms and those with larger shares of subsidiaries in tax havens experienced larger drops. We find some evidence that government scrutiny, reputation, and investor sentiment were plausible channels of such a negative impact.

Previous theoretical and empirical studies suggest that CEOs' political connections are valuable to firms. We examine whether such connections become entrenched if the expected political capital fails to materialize and the firm lacks other types of political power. Using a sample of listed non-SOEs in China, we show that politically connected CEOs have a lower probability of turnover and cause a weaker turnover-performance sensitivity than non-politically connected CEOs. Further analyses show that these turnover patterns are not consistent with alternative explanations, such as superior managerial ability, being a member of controlling families or being promoted from the inside. The turnover patterns are less pronounced in firms with alternative political power, such as connected boards or being vital to the local economy. Following the turnover of politically connected CEOs, firm performance does not necessarily undergo significant improvement. Our results call for new theories that comprehend the real effects of political connections.

We study the asset pricing implications arising from imperfect investor protection using a new governance measure. This is defined as the product of institutional quality in a country and the proportion of free float shares, which captures the impact of controlling block holders. Using monthly returns of 4756 blue chip firms from 50 international equity markets for 13years, we show through tests of variants of the augmented-CAPM, that a two factor CAPM augmented with a factor mimicking portfolio based on our new investor protection metric yields the highest explanatory power, especially for markets that exhibit true variation in ownership types.

Existing literature emphasizes skills-based explanations for executive-firm matching, namely in the context of financial expertise. In contrast, our paper argues that informational concerns may also be relevant. We model a public firm with a project opportunity of uncertain quality, where long-run shareholders choose between hiring an operational manager or a financial expert. These managers are equally myopic, however financial experts are also privy to stock-market beliefs. Financial experts invest sub-optimally due to catering incentives, while operational managers tend to engage in signaling-driven overinvestment. We show that operational managers are preferred for low-NPV projects or when stock markets are well informed.

We produce the first study to explore the effect of political money contributions on IPOs. Exploiting a hand-collected database, we show that both lobbying and PAC expenditure pay off on issue day as donors incur less underpricing, an effect that can be amplified by contribution size and strategic targeting of recipients. Investigating the causes in multiple channels, we also associate donor IPOs with negative offer price revisions and lower aftermarket volatility. Collectively, our results offer new empirical grounding to the information asymmetry theory.

M&A deals create more value for acquiring firm shareholders post-2009 than ever before. Public acquisitions fuel positive and statistically significant abnormal returns for acquirers while stock-for-stock deals no longer destroy value. Mega deals, priced at least $500mil, typically associated with more pronounced agency problems, investor scrutiny and media attention, seem to be driving the documented upturn. Acquiring shareholders now gain $62 mil around the announcement of such deals; a $325 mil gain improvement compared to 1990–2009. The corresponding synergistic gains have also catapulted to more than $542 mil pointing to overall value creation from M&As on a large scale. Our results are robust to different measures and controls and appear to be linked with profound improvements in the quality of corporate governance among acquiring firms in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis.

In line with the view that politics can complicate M&A deals, we find that firms contributing to political action committees or involved in lobbying are less likely to be acquired and their takeover process is lengthier. As we empirically show, this can be explained by the fact that politicians have motives to interfere with the takeover process due to career concerns, in terms of getting re-elected and raising funds for future campaigns. We also document that politically connected target firms command higher takeover premiums from bidders lacking political expertise, consistent with the notion that the market regards target firms' connections, not easily replicable by bidders, as means to enhance growth opportunities of the merged firm.

We examine how real investment decisions of firms are affected by their CEOs' career concerns. Relative to their older counterparts, younger CEOs are more likely to enter new lines of businesses and exit from existing ones. Younger CEOs undertake bolder expansions and divestments, which lead to significant increases and decreases in firm size, respectively. Younger CEOs also prefer to grow through acquisitions than de novo investments. However, such busier investment style of the younger CEOs appears not to hurt firm efficiency. Additional results also shed light on how CEO favoritism distorts capital allocation within firms.